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The query processing of relational data has been studied extensively throughout the
past decade. A number of theoretical and practical solutions to query processing have been
proposed under various scenarios. With the recent popularity of cloud computing, data
owners now have the opportunity to outsource not only their data but also data processing
functionalities to the cloud. Because of data security and personal privacy concerns, sensitive
data (e.g., medical records) should be encrypted before being outsourced to a cloud, and
the cloud should perform query processing tasks on the encrypted data only. These tasks
are termed as Privacy-Preserving Query Processing (PPQP) over encrypted data. Based
on the concept of Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC), SMC-based distributed protocols
were developed to allow the cloud to perform queries directly over encrypted data. These
protocols protect the confidentiality of the stored data, user queries, and data access patterns
from cloud service providers and other unauthorized users. Several queries were considered
in an attempt to create a well-defined scope. These queries included the k-Nearest Neighbor
(kNN) query, advanced analytical query, and correlated range query. The proposed protocols
utilize an additive homomorphic cryptosystem and/or a garbled circuit technique at different
stages of query processing to achieve the best performance. In addition, by adopting a multi-
cloud computing paradigm, all computations can be done on the encrypted data without
using very expensive fully homomorphic encryptions. The proposed protocols’ security was
analyzed theoretically, and its practicality was evaluated through extensive empirical results.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing [51, 66] enables an entity to outsource both its database and its data
processing functionalities. The cloud provides access mechanisms for not only querying but
also managing the hosted database. When data is outsourced, the data owner can enjoy the
benefits of reduced data management costs, reduced data storage overhead, and improved
service. Unfortunately, the cloud cannot be fully trusted; preserving data confidentiality and
query privacy is a challenging task. This is because it is difficult for the cloud to actually
guarantee the confidentiality of sensitive data. The challenge arises due to several well-
documented security risks faced by existing cloud service providers [31, 47, 81, 82, 94, 103].
One such risk, for instance, is that when a breach occurs in the cloud, any sensitive data
stored in the clear (i.e., not encrypted) can be easily exposed to the attacker.
One straightforward way to protect the confidentiality of outsourced data from the
cloud as well as from unauthorized users involves the data owner encrypting the data before
it is outsourced [1, 61, 77]. This encryption guarantees the confidentiality of data, even
when a cloud is compromised due to external threats such as hacking. A potentially curious,
untrustworthy, or even malicious cloud operator can track down the user’s queries and infer
what the user is looking for. Thus, a user’s query privacy may be compromised while
searching through hosted data within the cloud. To help preserve query privacy, authorized
users demand that their queries become encrypted before they are sent to the cloud for
evaluation. Furthermore, the cloud can derive useful and sensitive information about the
actual data items by observing the data access patterns during query processing, even if
the data and the query are encrypted [27, 97]. The term “data access patterns” refers to
the relationships between the encrypted data that can be observed by the cloud during the
query processing, such as the outcome of the search (i.e., which records have been retrieved).
During query processing, the need is to keep not only the data private from the cloud
but also the users’ input queries. The question to ask is “how can the cloud execute queries
over encrypted data without ever decrypting them or compromising the user’s privacy?”
Such a question has resulted in a specific research area known as query processing over
encrypted data.
2A trivial solution is to encrypt the data with symmetric key encryption schemes(
e.g., Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
)
and then outsource it to a cloud. At first,
it seems to be a better approach. Data encryption by symmetric key encryption schemes,
however, restricts a cloud’s ability to perform fundamental data processing functionality
(e.g., query processing) without disclosing the original data and user queries. Under this
case, the only option for the user is to download the whole encrypted data from the cloud,
decrypt the data, and then perform queries on the plaintext data locally. However, this is
clearly impractical, especially for mobile users and large data.
Following the aforementioned discussions, it is clear that there is a strong need to
develop protocols for query processing over encrypted data that can guarantee the following:
(1) maintaining the confidentiality of encrypted data, (2) ensuring the privacy of a user’s
query, and (3) hiding data access patterns.
This work was conducted to address the challenge of performing queries on encrypted
outsourced data in a cloud without compromising either the data’s confidentiality or the
user’s queries. This work focuses on developing secure protocols over encrypted data under
the semi-honest model for the following types of queries: the k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN)
query, advanced analytical query, and correlated range query. The k-Nearest Neighbor
query identifies the top k closest records to the query input record at the database. The
advanced analytical query performs any data mining task (e.g., classification). Given a
specific threshold t, the correlated range query aims to find all records in the dataset whose
distances with the query lie either below or above t, depending on the application.
1.1. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
This work considers the following scenarios. There are three different distributed
parties including the data owner (here referred to as Alice), the cloud, and the data autho-
rized consumer/user (here referred to as Bob). Let T denote Alice’s database with n records,
denoted by 〈t1, . . . , tn〉, and m attributes. Let ti,j denote the jth attribute value of tuple ti
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Assume that Alice encrypts her database (T ) attribute-wise
using her public key (pk) and outsources both the encrypted database and all future query
3processing services to a cloud. This work assumed that Alice’s public/secret keys are gen-
erated using a semantically secure and an Additive Homomorphic Public Key Encryption
(AH-Enc) scheme (such as the Paillier cryptosystem [75]). Semantic security means that
ciphertexts should be computationally indistinguishable from the cloud’s perspective. If the
encryption scheme is semantically secure, then the ciphertexts are random numbers from
the cloud’s perspective. That ensures that the cloud cannot distinguish an encryption of
one message from another [45]. More details are given in Section 3.3. By encrypting the
data using an AH-Enc scheme, Alice makes it possible for the cloud to conduct certain
mathematical operations directly over encrypted data.
Let T ′ denote Alice’s encrypted database. Suppose Alice allows Bob to securely
retrieve data from T ′ in the cloud. Suppose also that at some future time, Bob wants to
execute a query
(
q = 〈q1, . . . , qm〉
)
on T ′ in the cloud in a privacy-preserving manner. During
this process, neither Bob’s query (q) nor the database’s contents (T ) should be revealed to
the cloud. Access patterns to the data should also be protected from the cloud and other
unauthorized users. This process is referred to as Privacy-Preserving Query Processing
(PPQP) over encrypted data in the cloud. Let qout denote the set of records that satisfies
q. The PPQP protocol can now be formally defined as:
PPQP(T ′, q)→ qout
At the end of the PPQP protocol, the output qout should be revealed only to Bob (the
authorized user who initiated the query).
1.2. OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTIONS
This thesis addresses the problem of performing queries on encrypted data stored on
a cloud. PPQP protocols are proposed to facilitate different types of queries, namely, the k-
Nearest Neighbor query, the advanced analytical query, and the correlated range query that
protect the confidentiality of the stored data, user queries, and data access patterns from
cloud service providers and other unauthorized users. In the proposed protocols, once Alice
outsources her encrypted data to the cloud, she stops participating in the query processing
4task. Therefore, no information is revealed to Alice. The protocols proposed in this thesis
meet the following privacy requirements:
• Data confidentiality - During the query processing, neither the contents (T ) nor any
intermediate results are disclosed to the cloud.
• Query privacy - At any point in time, Bob’s input query (q) should not be disclosed
to the cloud or to Alice.
• Hiding data access patterns - Access patterns to the data (e.g., the records correspond-
ing to q) should not be revealed to either Alice or the cloud to prevent any inference
attacks. Access patterns related to any intermediate computations should also be hid-
den from the cloud, thereby preserving the semantic security of the encrypted data.
• Output security - At the end of the protocol, the output qout should be revealed only
to Bob; no information should be revealed to the cloud. Additionally, no information
other than qout should be revealed to Bob.
The intermediate results observed by the cloud in these protocols are either newly generated,
randomized encryptions or random numbers. Thus, the data records that correspond to
query q are unknown to the cloud.
The desirable privacy requirements can be relaxed to provide a practical, more ef-
ficient protocol. For example, a protocol can be allowed to leak a specified amount of
information (e.g., data access patterns) to the cloud to improve efficiency.
Additionally, the proposed protocols achieve the following properties:
• Efficiency - These protocols incur a low computational overhead (negligible compu-
tation cost) on the end-user. After Bob sends his encrypted query to the cloud, he
stops involving in any computations (less workload at Bob’s local machine). Hence,
data access patterns are further protected from Bob. He only performs a very small
number of encryption/decryption operations (bounded by the number of attributes).
• Correctness - The output qout should be computed accurately.
51.3. ORGANIZATION
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents an overview of some existing
work that is closely related to the research being proposed. Chapter 3 provides basic in-
formation regarding SMC and the AH-Enc scheme. This chapter also introduces a set of
privacy-preserving primitives, along with their implementations and security analysis, under
the semi-honest model.
Chapter 4 considers the kNN query over relational data. In particular, this chapter
focuses on solving the secure processing of kNN query over encrypted relational data. More
specifically, this chapter presents two novel Secure k-Nearest Neighbor (SkNN) protocols
[29]. Data confidentiality and query privacy of both protocols are completely protected.
The first protocol (which acts as a basic solution) leaks a specified amount of information
(data access patterns) to the cloud. The second protocol is more secure (provides a better
security guarantee) as it hides the data access patterns. The second protocol, however, is
more expensive than the first protocol.
Chapter 5 addresses the advanced analytical query over relational data. In par-
ticular, this chapter focuses on solving the classification problem over encrypted data. A
novel Privacy-Preserving k-Nearest Neighbor (PPkNN) protocol over semantically secure
encrypted data is developed [85]. This protocol protects not only the confidentiality of the
original data but also the user query from the cloud. It also hides the data access patterns
and the classification result. The proposed protocol’s performance under different parameter
settings is evaluated in this chapter.
The correlated range query over image data is discussed in Chapter 6. More specifi-
cally, Content-Based Image Retrieval (CBIR) is considered. A desirable image was retrieved
from a large amount of image data based on the similarity of some common attributes,
known as features. More specifically, this chapter proposes a secure Outsourceable and
Privacy-Preserving Biometric Authentication (PPBAO) protocol, which is a special case of
CBIR [21]. At a high level, a hybrid approach is adopted to implement PPBAO in order to
take advantage of both homomorphic encryption and garbled circuit-based approaches to
achieve the best performance while simultaneously protecting both the confidentiality of the
biometric data and the user’s input query, in addition to hiding the data access patterns.
6In this chapter, the protocol’s security is analyzed and it’s performance under different pa-
rameter settings is evaluated. The proposed PPBAO was also modified slightly to produce
an Outsourceable and Privacy-Preserving Biometric Identification (PPBIO) protocol. The
PPBIO protocol completely protects the confidentiality of the stored biometric data, user
queries, and data access patterns from cloud service providers and other unauthorized users.
Both the contributions of this work as well as the potential for future studies are
discussed in Chapter 7.
72. RELATED WORK
This chapter reviews the existing work related to the Secure k-Nearest Neighbor
[29] techniques, Privacy-Preserving Data Mining [85], and Privacy-Preser- ving Biometric
Authentication/Identification [21] protocols.
2.1. SECURE k-NEAREST NEIGHBOR TECHNIQUES
Retrieving the k-Nearest Neighbors to a given query (q) is one of the most fundamen-
tal problems in many application domains such as similarity search, pattern recognition, and
data mining. In the literature, many techniques have been proposed to address the SkNN
problem, which can be classified into two categories based on whether the data are encrypted
or not: centralized and distributed.
Centralized Methods : In the centralized methods, the data owner is assumed to
outsource his/her database and DBMS functionalities (e.g., kNN query) to an untrusted
external service provider, which manages the data on behalf of the data owner, where only
the trusted users are allowed to query the hosted data. By outsourcing data to an untrusted
server, many security issues arise such as data privacy (protecting the confidentiality of the
data from both the server and the query issuer). To achieve data privacy, the data owner
is required to use data anonymization models (e.g., k-anonymity) or cryptographic (e.g.,
encryption and data perturbation) techniques over his/her data before outsourcing them to
the server.
Encryption is a traditional technique used to protect the confidentiality of sensitive
data such as medical records. Due to data encryption, the process of query evaluation
over encrypted data becomes challenging. Along this direction, various techniques have
been proposed for processing range queries [49, 50, 91] and aggregation queries [46, 68] over
encrypted data. This work, however, restricts the discussion to secure evaluation of the
kNN query.
In the past few years, researchers have proposed different methods [51, 98, 99, 105]
to address the SkNN problem. Wong et al. [98] proposed a new encryption scheme called
8Asymmetric Scalar-Product-preserving Encryption (ASPE) that preserves the scalar prod-
uct between the query vector (q) and any tuple vector (ti) from database (T ) for distance
comparison, which is sufficient to find kNN. Both the data and query are encrypted using
slightly different encryption schemes before outsourcing to the server, and all the query
users know the decryption key. As an improvement, Zhu et al. [105] proposed a novel
SkNN method in which the key of the data owner is not disclosed to the user. However,
their architecture requires the participation of the data owner during query encryption.
As an alternative, Hu et al. [51] proposed a method based on a provably secure privacy
homomorphism encryption scheme from a provably secure additive and multiplicative pri-
vacy homomorphism [28] that supports modular addition, subtraction, and multiplication
over encrypted data. They addressed the SkNN problem under the following setting: the
client has the ciphertexts of all data points in database T and the encryption function of
T , whereas the server has the decryption function of T and some auxiliary information re-
garding each data point. Both methods [51, 98], however, are not secure because they are
vulnerable to chosen-plaintext attacks. All the above methods also leak data access patterns
to the server.
Recently, Yao et al. [99] proposed a new SkNN method based on partition-based a
Secure Voronoi Diagram (SVD). Instead of asking the cloud to retrieve the exact kNN, they
required the cloud to retrieve a relevant encrypted partition
(
Epk(G) for Epk(T )
)
such that
G is guaranteed to contain the k-nearest neighbors of q. This work, however, solves the
SkNN problem accurately by letting the cloud retrieve the exact k-Nearest Neighbors of q
(in encrypted form). Additionally, most of the computations during the query processing
step in [51, 99, 105] are performed locally by the end-user. That conflicts with the purpose
of outsourcing the DataBase Management System (DBMS) functionalities to the cloud.
Furthermore, the protocol in secure nearest neighbor revisited [99] leaks data access patterns,
such as the partition ID corresponding to a user query, to the cloud.
Data Distribution Methods : In the data distributed methods, data are assumed to
be partitioned either vertically or horizontally and distributed among a set of independent,
non-colluding parties. The data distributed methods rely on SMC techniques that enable
multiple parties to securely evaluate a function using their respective private inputs without
9disclosing the input of one party to the others. Many efforts have been made to address
the problem of the kNN query in a distributed environment. Shaneck et al. [89] proposed
a privacy-preserving algorithm to perform the k-Nearest Neighbor search. The protocol in
privacy preserving nearest neighbor search [89] is based on Secure Multiparty Computation
for privately computing kNN points in a horizontally partitioned dataset. Qi et al. [79]
proposed a single-step kNN search protocol that is provably secure with linear computa-
tion and communication complexities. Vaidya et al. [92] studied privacy-preserving top-k
queries in which the data are vertically partitioned. Ghinita et al. [39] proposed a Private
Information Retrieval (PIR) based framework for answering kNN queries in location-based
services. Their solution, however, protects only the query privacy (i.e., it does not address
data confidentiality and access pattern issues). Note that, in private queries in location
based services [39], the data residing in the server are in plaintext format. However, if the
data are encrypted to ensure data confidentiality, it is not clear how a user can obliviously
retrieve the output records because he/she does not know the indices that match his/her
input query. Nevertheless, even if a user can retrieve the records using PIR, the user still
needs to perform local computations to identify the k-Nearest Neighbors. However, in this
study, the user’s computation is completely outsourced to a cloud.
In summary, the above data distribution methods are not applicable to perform kNN
queries over encrypted data for two reasons: (1) This work deals with an encrypted form of
the data and query, which is not the case in the above methods. (2) The data in this work
are assumed to be encrypted and stored in the cloud, whereas, in the above methods, they
are partitioned (in plaintext format) among different parties.
2.2. PRIVACY-PRESERVING DATA MINING
Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) is defined as the process of extracting/
deriving knowledge about data without compromising the privacy of the data [3, 64, 80]. In
the past decade, a number of PPDM techniques have been proposed to facilitate users in
performing data mining tasks in privacy-sensitive environments. Agrawal and Srikant [3], as
well as Lindell and Pinkas [63], were the first to introduce the notion of privacy-preserving
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under data mining applications. Existing PPDM techniques can be classified into two broad
categories: data perturbation and data distribution.
Data Perturbation Methods : With these methods, values of individual data records
are perturbed by adding random noise in such a way that the distribution of the perturbed
data look very different from that of the actual data. After such a transformation, the
perturbed data is sent to the Miner to perform the desired data mining tasks. Agrawal
and Srikant [3] proposed the first data perturbation technique that could be used to build a
decision-tree classifier. A number of randomization-based methods were later proposed [6,
33, 34, 73, 104]. Data perturbation techniques are not, however, applicable to semantically-
secure encrypted data. They also fail to produce accurate data mining results due to the
addition of statistical noises to the data.
Data Distribution Methods: These methods assume that the dataset is partitioned
either horizontally or vertically and distributed across different parties. The parties can later
collaborate to securely mine the combined data and learn the global data mining results.
During this process, data owned by individual parties is not revealed to other parties. This
approach was first introduced by Lindell and Pinkas [63] who proposed a decision tree
classifier under a two-party setting. A number of studies have since used SMC techniques
[2, 22, 51, 57, 100].
Classification is one important task in many applications of data mining, including
health-care and business. Recently, performing data mining in the cloud attracted signifi-
cant attention. In cloud computing, the data owner outsources his/her data to the cloud.
However, from the user’s perspective, privacy becomes an important issue when sensitive
data needs to be outsourced to the cloud. The direct way to guard the outsourced data is
to apply encryption on the data before outsourcing.
Existing privacy-preserving classification techniques are not sufficient and applicable
in this work for the following reasons: (i) In the existing methods, data are partitioned (in
plaintext format) among different parties, whereas in this work, they are assumed to be
encrypted and stored in the cloud. (ii) They fail to produce accurate data mining results
because some amount of information is lost due to the addition of statistical noises (in order
to hide the sensitive attributes). (iii) Data access patterns can be leaked. The cloud can
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easily derive useful and sensitive information about users’ data items by simply observing
the data access patterns.
2.3. PRIVACY-PRESERVING BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION/ IDENTI-
FICATION
Biometric authentication or identification is a special case of Content-Based Image
Retrieval (CBIR). In a CBIR system, a desirable image is retrieved from a large image
database based on the similarity of some common attributes, which are called features.
There are two kinds of features: global and local. Global features usually include color,
texture, and shape, which are well-known and studied in image retrieval. Local features are
usually used in a localized circumstance, which needs to recognize objects more precisely.
The formulation of Privacy-Preserving Biometric Identification (PPBI) is slightly
different from Privacy-Preserving Biometric Authentication (PPBA). The PPBI protocol
generally returns the profile of any person whose biometric data record (stored on the
server) matches the user’s input biometric data record. In contrast, the PPBA protocol
only returns a single bit to indicate if there is a match or not. Existing PPBI protocols
can be easily modified to satisfy the PPBA problem statement definition. From a technical
perspective, the difference between PPBI and PPBA is negligible. Since there is a lack of
existing work directly related to PPBA, works mainly related to PPBI are presented. In
both PPBA and PPBI, the involved biometric data is never disclosed to the participating
parties, except for their own data.
Erkin et al. [30] proposed the first privacy-preserving biometric face recognition
protocol based on the standard Eigenfaces recognition algorithm. The protocol is a secure
two-party computation protocol where one party (client) wants to learn whether its can-
didate biometric reading matches for one or more records in the other party’s (server’s)
database without disclosing any information except the final result. The protocol computes
Euclidean distances between face image feature vectors from the client and server’s face
image database, and it returns the profile information associated with the facial image data
record that has the smallest distance to the client’s input biometric data. In the end, the
client only knows the profile information without knowing other biometric data and their
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associated profiles stored at the server, and the server knows nothing, even regarding the
profile information returned to the client. The data exchanged during an execution of the
protocol are encrypted by an AH-Enc scheme, but the data stored at the sever are not
encrypted. Therefore, the server knows the contents of its biometric database.
Sadeghi et al. [83] developed a hybrid privacy-preserving face recognition protocol
that improved the efficiency of Erkin’s work. This protocol follows the problem setting of
Erkin’s work and also uses an AH-Enc (the Paillier cryptosystem) to securely compute
Euclidean distances. On the other hand, garbled circuits [53, 102] are used to find out the
minimum distance. The authors also proposed a method of packing multiple values together
into a single ciphertext before blinding. This can save significant communication costs.
Huang et al. [32] developed an efficient Privacy-Preserving Biometric Identification
protocol for fingerprint recognition. The basic algorithm for fingerprint identification is
based on FingerCode [55]. In the main system, the server and a client jointly perform
the protocol to retrieve the identity record from the server’s database whose fingerprint
best matches the client’s input fingerprint reading. The protocol provides the same security
guarantee as the previously mentioned protocols. In addition, similar to Sadeghi’s work,
this protocol also combines AH-Enc with garbled circuits. However, the protocol improves
efficiency for both the distance-computing phase and matching phase compared to Sadeghi’s
work. The protocol separates the retrieval step from the matching phase, and it uses the
by-product of evaluating the garbled circuit in the matching phase to perform the oblivious
retrieval efficiently. In the retrieval phase, the protocol utilizes a backtracking tree to
obliviously and efficiently recover the profile corresponding to the closest matching vector.
Blanton and Gasti [11] developed a Privacy-Preserving Biometric Identification pro-
tocol for iris codes based on Hamming distance. In their protocol, the client who possesses
an iris reading would also like to learn whether his/her reading matches one or more records
in an iris database managed by the server. The contents of the server’s database are never
disclosed to the client, but the client learns the comparison results between his/her input iris
record and every record in the server’s database. The implementation of the protocol also
uses bothAH-Enc and garbled circuits, and it reduces the complexity of the circuits used for
comparison based on an optimization that permits XOR gates to be evaluated for free. The
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proposed techniques can be applied in protocols where FingerCode and Euclidean distances
are adopted to improve the performance compared to the existing Euclidean distance-based
solutions.
SCiFI [74] is a realization of a privacy-preserving face identification system that
uses a component-based face identification technique that builds a binary index into a
vocabulary representation. The adopted image representation technique is robust against
different viewing conditions, such as illumination, occlusions, and changes in appearance
(like wearing glasses). The protocol utilizes Hamming distance to measure image similarity,
and its implementation was based on AH-Enc and oblivious transfer [69].
Although the aforementioned privacy-preserving biometric identification/authentica-
tion protocols protect the confidentiality of both the server’s and client’s biometric data, in
this study, the problem setting is quite different from these protocols. This study deals with
the encrypted form of the biometric database that is outsourced to a server (or a cloud),
and the server does not have the key to decrypt the data. Thus, the server does not know
anything regarding the original biometric database. Since the previously proposed solutions
require the server to perform computations on the original biometric data, these solutions
cannot be applied to solve this outsourced biometric authentication problem.
Recently, Blanton and Aliasgari [10] developed a secure approach to outsourcing the
computations of matching iris biometric data records. The setting of their work is very
similar to this study. Two protocols were proposed for either a single-server setting or a
multiple-server setting. In their single-server setting, the protocol uses a predicated encryp-
tion scheme [59, 90] that allows the server to perform non-interactive computations. The
predicate encryption scheme is not as secure as AH-Enc. As a result, the protocol proposed
in this study offers much better protection of the biometric data’s confidentiality. Under
the multiple-server setting, the protocol adopts a secret sharing scheme (e.g., Shamir [88])
to “encrypt” the outsourced biometric database. The protocol, however, requires at least
three independent servers to perform the intermediate computations, whereas this study
only requires two; thus, it is more practical. Additionally, the protocol mainly focuses on
calculating Hamming distance, whereas this work allows Euclidean and Hamming distances
to be calculated. Since both distances are commonly used to retrieve images according to
14
different kinds of biometric data, this work offers more generality. Another difference is that,
at the end of protocol execution, the server can know which encrypted biometric data record
matches the client’s input. This access pattern leakage can violate the security guarantee of
the underlying encryption scheme [54]. Because this work does not disclose this information
to any participating party, it offers the same security protection as the encryption scheme
used to encrypt the outsourced biometric data.
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3. SECURITY DEFINITIONS AND BASIC SECURITY PRIMITIVES
This chapter presents basic information about Secure Multiparty Computation along
with the security threat or adversary models that best match in this study. Then, it sum-
marizes the homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme used in this study as a back-
ground. Finally, it introduces a set of sub-protocols [21, 29, 85] that were used as basic
primitives when constructing the proposed PPQP protocols, along with their possible im-
plementations, security, and complexity analysis. For ease of presentation, some common
notations that are used extensively throughout this chapter are summarized in Table 3.1.
3.1. SECURE MULTIPARTY COMPUTATION
Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) was first introduced by Yao’s Millionaire
Problem [101, 102], where Alice and Bob want to know who is richer without disclosing their
actual wealth to each other. Suppose there are n parties (P1, . . . , Pn) who hold private inputs
(a1, . . . , an). An SMC protocol allows P1, . . . , Pn to collaboratively compute a function f on
inputs a1, . . . , an without disclosing ai to Pj, where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and i 6= j. To achieve that,
the participating parties have to exchange messages and perform some local computations
until all the parties get the desired output. More formally, SMC allows the evaluation of
the function f(a1, . . . , an) = (r1, . . . , rn) such that the output (ri) is known only to party Pi
and the privacy of each party’s input (ai) is preserved.
The first general and provably secure solution for a two-party case was developed
by Yao, and it demonstrated that any function that can be described by a polynomial
size boolean circuit of logarithm depth can be solved securely [101, 102]. This work was
extended to multiparty computations by Goldreich et al. [42]. It was proved in [42] that
any computation that can be done in polynomial time by a single party can also be done
securely by multiple parties. Since then, much work has been published for the multiparty
case [7, 8, 18, 19, 23, 40, 58, 62].
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Table 3.1: Common notations
P1, P2 Two non-colluding semi-honest parties
〈Epk, Dsk〉 A pair of Paillier’s encryption and decryption functions with(pk, sk) as public-secret key pair
X , Y
m-dimensional vectors, and the content of the individual dimen-
sion is represented by xj (yj), where 1 ≤ j ≤ m
Epk(X), Epk(Y )
Attribute-wise encryption of X, Y in which Epk(X) =〈




Epk(y1), . . . , Epk(ym)
〉
3.2. THREAT MODEL
In general, there is a conceptual difference between privacy and security. This work,
however, will not differentiate the two terms. Regarding a distributed protocol, security is
generally related to the amount of information leaked during the protocol execution. The
goal is to ensure no information, other than what they can deduce from their own outputs,
is leaked to the involved parties. There are many ways to define information disclosure. To
maximize privacy, or minimize information disclosure, security definitions that appear in
the literature of SMC were adopted for this study.
SMC-based secure protocols generally assume three basic adversarial models: semi-
honest (also referred to as honest but curious), covert, and malicious. An adversarial model
generally specifies what an adversary or attacker is allowed to do during an execution of
a secure protocol. In the semi-honest model, an attacker (i.e., one of the participating
parties) is expected to follow the prescribed steps of a protocol. The attacker, however, can
compute any additional information based on his/her private input, output, and messages
received during an execution of the secure protocol. As a result, whatever can be inferred
from the private input and output of an attacker is not considered as a privacy violation.
An adversary in the semi-honest model can be treated as a passive attacker, whereas an
adversary in the malicious model can be treated as an active attacker who can arbitrarily
diverge from the normal execution of a protocol. In contrast, the covert adversary model
[5] lies between the semi-honest and malicious models. More specifically, an adversary
under the covert model may deviate arbitrarily from the rules of a protocol in the case of
cheating. The honest party is guaranteed to detect this cheating with good probability. In
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this study, to develop secure, efficient protocols, all the participating parties were assumed
to be semi-honest.
Detailed security definitions and models can be found in other studies [40, 41]. The
following definition briefly captures the previous discussion regarding a secure protocol under
a semi-honest model:
Definition 1. Let ai be the input of party Pi, Πi(pi) be the party Pi’s execution image of
the protocol pi, and ri be the result computed from pi for the party Pi. Then, pi is secure
if Πi(pi) can be simulated from (ai, ri) such that the distribution of a simulated image is
computationally indistinguishable from Πi(pi).
A formal way to prove the security of a protocol under the semi-honest model is to
use the simulation approach [43]. The execution image in Definition 1 typically includes
the input, the output, and the messages communicated during the execution of a protocol.
To prove a protocol is secure under the semi-honest model, it is required to show that the
execution image of a protocol does not leak any information regarding the private inputs of
participating parties [40].
Definition 2. Composition Theorem [41]: If a protocol consists of sub-protocols, the protocol
is secure as long as the sub-protocols are secure and all the intermediate results are random
or pseudo-random.
In this work, the proposed PPQP protocols are constructed based on a sequential
composition of sub-protocols. Thus, the security of each sub-protocol needed to be proved
before the PPQP’s security could be proved. In other words, to formally prove the security
of the proposed PPQP protocols under the semi-honest model, according to the composi-
tion theorem given in Definition 2, one needed to show that the simulated image of each
sub-protocol was computationally indistinguishable from the actual execution image and it
produced random shares or pseudo-random as intermediate results.
3.2.1. Justification of Use of Semi-Honest Model. By semi-honest model,
this work implicitly assumes that the cloud service providers (or other participating users)
utilized in the protocols proposed in this study do not collude. This model may not be
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appropriate for situations in which background knowledge on the parties is missing (e.g.,
P1 and P2). There are two main reasons to adopt the semi-honest adversary model in
this study. First, as mentioned in “Faster secure two-party computation using garbled
circuits” [53], developing protocols under the semi-honest setting is an important first step
towards constructing protocols with stronger security guarantees. Almost all practical SMC-
based protocols (e.g., [48, 52, 53, 72]) are secure under the semi-honest model. Using zero-
knowledge proofs [43], these protocols can be transformed into secure protocols under the
malicious model. Second, both P1 and P2 were assumed to be two cloud service providers.
Today, cloud service providers in the market are legitimate, well-known companies (e.g.,
Amazon, Google, and Microsoft). These companies maintain reputations that are invaluable
assets that need to be protected at all costs. Thus, a collusion between them is highly
unlikely as it will damage their reputation, which, in turn, affects their revenues. Therefore,
P1 and P2 can safely be assumed to be semi-honest. As a consequence, in this study, it is
very realistic to assume that the participating parties are semi-honest.
3.3. ADDITIVE HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
Homomorphic encryption is a special type of encryption that allows operating on
ciphertexts without decrypting them [67]. This work adopted an Additive Homomorphic
Public Key Encryption (AH-Enc) scheme as the building block. Let Epk and Dsk be the
encryption and decryption functions, respectively, in an AH-Enc scheme with public key pk
and private key sk. Without sk, no one can discover x from Epk(x) in polynomial time. For
any given two plaintexts x, y ∈ ZN , an AH-Enc scheme exhibits the following properties:
a. Homomorphic Addition - The encryption function is additive homomorphic. The







Epk(x) ∗ Epk(y) mod N2
)
b. Homomorphic Multiplication - An encrypted plaintext raised to the power of another












c. Probablistic - Let c1 = Epk(x) and c2 =Epk(y),
Probability for c1 6= c2 is very high even if x = y
d. Semantic Security - The encryption scheme is semantically secure, as defined in “The
Foundations of Cryptography” and “The knowledge complexity of interactive proof
systems” [41, 44]. Briefly, given a set of ciphertexts, an encryption scheme is seman-
tically secure if an adversary cannot deduce/learn any information about the plain-
text(s) with polynomial-bounded computing power. In other words, the encryption
scheme is secure against a chosen-plaintext attack.
Any Additive Homomorphic Public Key Encryption (AH-Enc) system is applicable,
but the Paillier encryption scheme [75] was adopted in this study for its implementation
simplicity. Informally speaking, the public key in the system is (N ,g), where N is the result
of multiplying two large prime numbers of similar bit length and g ∈ Z∗N2 is a randomly
chosen generator. For succinctness, the mod N2 term that occurs during homomorphic
operations has been dropped from the remainder of this work. Note that, for any given
x ∈ ZN, “N − x” is equivalent to “−x” under ZN . Hereafter, the notation r ∈R ZN is used
to denote r as a random number in ZN .
Example 1. Let Epk be the encryption function with public key pk for any given two plaintexts
x, y ∈ ZN , and r ∈R Z. According to the additive homomorphic property of the encryption
scheme, Epk(x− y + r) can be computed as follows:
Epk(x− y + r)← Epk(x) ∗ Epk(y)N−1 ∗ Epk(r) 
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3.4. DISTANCE COMPUTATION
This work adopted the two most common distance metrics to implement the proposed
PPQP protocols: Euclidean distance and Hamming distance. Suppose X and Y are m-
dimensional vectors and the content of dimension j is represented by xj (yj), where 1 ≤ j ≤
m.
3.4.1. Euclidean Distance. The Euclidean distance between X and Y can be
computed as follows:
Euclidean_Dist(X, Y ) =
√√√√ m∑
i=1
(xj − yj)2 (3.1)
When comparing two distances, the square root does not make any difference. Thus,
in this work, the square root was dropped to compute the square of the Euclidean distance
between X and Y :
Euclidean_Dist2(X, Y ) = |X − Y |2 =
m∑
i=1
(xj − yj)2 (3.2)
where |X − Y | denotes the Euclidean distance between vectors X and Y .
3.4.2. Hamming Distance. When X and Y are binary vectors, Hamming dis-
tance can be used to determine how close X and Y are. At a high level, the Hamming
distance can be computed as follows:
Hamming_Dist(X, Y ) = m−
m∑
j=1
xj ∗ yj (3.3)
3.5. BASIC SECURITY PRIMITIVES
A set of generic sub-protocols that are used as basic primitives when constructing
the proposed Privacy-Preserving Query Processing (PPQP) protocols are presented here
[21, 29, 85]. All of the following protocols are considered under a two-party semi-honest
setting. In particular, assume the existence of two semi-honest parties (P1 and P2) such
that Paillier’s secret key (sk) is known only to P2; the pk is public. Also, let X and
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Y be m-dimensional vectors in which Epk(X) =
〈
Epk(x1), . . . , Epk(xm)
〉
and Epk(Y ) =〈
Epk(y1), . . . , Epk(ym)
〉
.
The term random shares means that the actual value is divided into two additive
random shares, each of which is independently and uniformly distributed in a group
(
e.g.,
ZN = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}
)
. The actual value can be reconstructed by adding the two shares’
modulo N .
As mentioned in Section 3.2, to formally prove that a protocol is secure under the
semi-honest model, one must show that the simulated execution image of that protocol is
computationally indistinguishable from its actual execution image [41]. In other words, an
execution image of that protocol does not leak any information regarding the private inputs
of participating parties. An execution image generally includes the messages exchanged and
the information computed from these messages.
Next, each of these protocols are discussed in detail along with their complexity and
security analysis. This work either proposed a new solution or referred to the most efficient
known implementation to each of these protocols.




and a party (P2) with the secret key (sk). The goal of the Secure Multiplication (SM)
protocol is to return the encryption of a∗ b (i.e., Epk(a∗ b) as output to P1). No information
regarding either a or b is revealed either to P1 or P2 during this protocol. The basic idea of
the SM protocol is based on the following property, which holds for any given a, b ∈ ZN :
a ∗ b = (a+ ra) ∗ (b+ rb)− a ∗ rb − b ∗ ra − ra ∗ rb (3.4)
where all the arithmetic operations are performed under ZN . The overall steps in SM
are shown in Algorithm 1. Briefly, P1 initially randomizes both a and b by computing
a′ = Epk(a) ∗ Epk(ra) and b′ = Epk(b) ∗ Epk(rb) and sends them to P2. Here, ra and rb are
random numbers in ZN and known only to P1. Upon receiving, P2 decrypts and multiplies
them to get h = (a + ra) ∗ (b + rb) mod N . Then, P2 encrypts h and sends it to P1. After
this, P1 removes extra random factors from h′ = Epk
(
(a+ ra) ∗ (b+ rb)
)
based on Equation
3.4 to get Epk(a ∗ b).
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Algorithm 1 SM(Epk(a), Epk(b))→ Epk(a ∗ b)
Require: P1 has Epk(a) and Epk(b); P2 has sk
1: P1:
(a). Pick two random numbers ra, rb ∈ ZN
(b). a′ ← Epk(a) ∗ Epk(ra)
(c). b′ ← Epk(b) ∗ Epk(rb)
(d). Send a′, b′ to P2
2: P2:
(a). Receive a′ and b′ from P1
(b). ha ← Dsk(a′); hb ← Dsk(b′)
(c). h← ha ∗ hb mod N
(d). h′ ← Epk(h)
(e). Send h′ to P1
3: P1:
(a). Receive h′ from P2
(b). s← h′ ∗ Epk(a)N−rb
(c). s′ ← s ∗ Epk(b)N−ra
(d). Epk(a ∗ b)← s′ ∗ Epk(N − ra ∗ rb)
Example 2. Assume that a = 59 and b = 58. For simplicity, let ra = 1 and rb = 3. Initially,
P1 computes a′ = Epk(60) = Epk(a) ∗ Epk(ra) and b′ = Epk(61) = Epk(b) ∗ Epk(rb) and
sends them to P2. Then, P2 decrypts and multiplies them to get h = 3660. After this,
P2 encrypts h to get h′ = Epk(3660) and sends it to P1. Upon receiving h′, P1 computes
s = Epk(3483) = Epk(3660 − a ∗ rb) and s′ = Epk(3425) = Epk(3483 − b ∗ ra). Finally, P1
computes Epk(a ∗ b) = Epk(3422) = Epk(3425− ra ∗ rb). 
Security Analysis: According to Algorithm 1, the execution image of P2 is denoted by
ΠP2(SM), where
ΠP2(SM) =
{〈a′, ha〉, 〈b′, hb〉}
Observe that ha = a + ra mod N and hb = b + rb mod N are derived upon decrypting a′
and b′, respectively. Note that both ha and hb are random numbers in ZN . Suppose that
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the simulated image of P2 is ΠSP2(SM), where
ΠSP2(SM) =
{〈a∗, r′a〉, 〈b∗, r′b〉}
Here, a∗ and b′∗ are randomly generated from ZN2 , whereas r′a and r′b are randomly gen-
erated from ZN . Because Epk is a semantically secure encryption scheme with a resulting
ciphertext size that is less than N2, a′ and b′ are computationally indistinguishable from
a∗ and b∗, respectively. Similarly, as ra and rb are randomly chosen from ZN , ha and hb
are computationally indistinguishable from r′a and r′b, respectively. As a result, ΠP2(SM) is
computationally indistinguishable from ΠSP2(SM).
Similarly, assume that the execution image of P1 is denoted by ΠP1(SM), where
ΠP1(SM) = {h′}
Here, h′ is an encrypted value. Let the simulated image of P1 be denoted by ΠSP1(SM),
where
ΠSP1(SM) = {h∗}
where h∗ is randomly chosen from ZN2 . Since Epk is a semantically secure encryption scheme
with a resulting ciphertext size of less than N2, h′ is computationally indistinguishable from
h∗. As a result, ΠP1(SM) is computationally indistinguishable from ΠSP1(SM). Putting the
above results together, and following from Definition 1, it was concluded that the SM was
secure under the semi-honest model.
Complexity Analysis: Each step of the SM protocol needed to be examined before the upper
bound could be derived. The SM protocol performed 4 encryptions and 2 multiplications at
Step 1. Step 2(b) involved performing 2 decryptions. A decryption has a cost that is similar
to an encryption (encryption and decryption times are almost the same under Paillier’s
scheme). Thus, 2 encryptions were counted for Step 2(a). Step 2(c,d) involved performing
1 multiplication and 1 encryption. Step 3(b-d) involved performing 2 encryptions and 3
multiplications. Although it was slightly less expensive than an encryption operation, the
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were counted as two encryptions. Therefore, the
total number of multiplications and encryptions for the Secure Multiplication protocol was
9 encryptions and 6 multiplications. Thus, the computation cost of Secure Multiplication
was bounded by a (small) constant number of encryptions and multiplications.





and P2 holds the secret key (sk). The goal of the Secure Squared
Euclidean Distance (SSED) protocol is to securely compute the encryption of the squared
Euclidean distance between vectorsX and Y . During this protocol, no information regarding
X and Y is revealed to either P1 or P2. The output of this protocol returns Epk
(|X − Y |2),
which is known only to P1. According to Equation 3.2, the main challenge is to compute
x2j , y2j , and xj ∗ yj from Epk(xj) and Epk(yj), where Epk(xj) and Epk(yj) are encryptions of
xj and yj.
The main steps involved in the SSED protocol are shown in Algorithm 2. Briefly, for
1 ≤ j ≤ m, P1 initially computes Epk(xj − yj) by using the homomorphic properties. Then,




, using the SM protocol, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Note





, P1 can compute Epk
(|X − Y |2) locally based on Equation 3.2.
Example 3. Suppose that P1 holds the encrypted data records of X and Y , given by Epk(X) =〈





Epk(56), Epk(1), Epk(3), Epk(130), Epk(256), Epk(1), Epk(2),
Epk(1), Epk(6), Epk(2)
〉
. During the SSED protocol, P1 initially computes Epk(x1 − y1) =


















P1 locally computes Epk
(|X − Y |2) = Epk(∑10i=1(xi − yi)2) = Epk(813). 
Security Analysis: The security of the SSED protocol directly follows from the SM protocol,
which is used as the fundamental building block in the SSED protocol. This is because,
apart from the SM protocol, the rest of the steps in the SSED protocol are non-interactive.








)→ Epk(|X − Y |2)
Require: P1 has Epk(X) and Epk(Y ); P2 has sk
1: P1, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m do:
(a). Epk(xj − yj)← Epk(xj) ∗ Epk(yj)N−1





using the SM protocol
3: P1:
(a). Epk
(|X − Y |2)←∏mj=1Epk((xj − yj)2)





locally (i.e., with no interaction between P1 and P2).
Complexity Analysis: Each step of the protocol needed to be examined before the upper
bound could be derived. The protocol performed m encryptions and m multiplications at
Step 1. Although it was slightly less expensive than an encryption operation, the Epk(yj)
N−1
was treated as one encryption. Since the SSED protocol utilized the SM protocol as a
sub-routine, Step 2 consisted of 7m multiplications and 10m encryptions (a detailed com-
plexity analysis of SM is discussed in Section 3.5.1). Step 3 required m− 1 multiplications.
Therefore, the total number of multiplications and encryptions for the SSED protocol was
bounded by O(m). Additionally, because an encryption operation is generally several orders
of magnitude more expensive than a multiplication, this work can claim that the computa-
tion complexity of the SSED protocol was bounded by O(m) encryptions, where m is the
vector size.
3.5.3. Secure Squared Euclidean Distance-Random Share. Suppose that P1




and P2 holds the secret key sk. The goal
of the Secure Squared Euclidean Distance-Random Share (SSEDR) protocol is to securely
compute the encryption of squared Euclidean distance between vectors X and Y , denoted
by Epk
(|X −Y |2). During the computation, both X and Y are never decrypted to preserve
the confidentiality of X and Y . Let de denote the squared Euclidean distance between X






Require: P1 has Epk(X) and Epk(Y ); P2 has the decryption key
1: P1:
(a) Epk(tj)← Epk(xj)− Epk(yj) + Epk(rj), where rj ∈R ZN and 1 ≤ j ≤ m
(b) Send Epk(t1), . . . , Epk(tm) to P2
2: P2:
(a) Perform decryption to get t1, . . . , tm










j=1 (xj − yj)2
)
(c) Compute Epk(de + r), where r ∈R ZN
(d) Set d′e = N − r and send Epk(de + r) to P2
4: P2:
(a) Perform decryption on Epk(de + r) to obtain de + r
(b) Set d′′e = de + r
party, such that d′e + d′′e mod N = de. Note that the random share d′e is known only to
P1, whereas the random share d′′e is known only to P2. The key steps to securely compute
the Euclidean distance between the two vectors, X and Y , based on Equation 3.2 are given
by Algorithm 3, where the computations are only based on either encrypted or randomized
data. At Step 1(a) of the algorithm, tj is a randomized difference between xj and yj, and rj
is randomly chosen to hide the actual difference. According to the additive homomorphic
property of the encryption scheme, Epk(tj) can be computed as follows:
Epk(xj − yj + rj)← Epk(xj) ∗ Epk(yj)N−1 ∗ Epk(rj)
P2 can decrypt Epk(tj) to obtain tj because it has the decryption key. P2 then
computes the square of tj and sends the encrypted results (e.g., Epk(t1), . . . , Epk(tm)) to P1.
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Since Epk(t2j) = Epk
(
(xj − yj)2 + 2rj(xj − yj) + r2j
)








)← Epk(t2j) ∗ (Epk(xj − yj)2rj ∗ Epk(r2j ))N−1




) ∗ · · · ∗ Epk((xm − ym)2)
The rest of the steps are straightforward. All of the above computations are based on the
additive homomorphic property of the encryption schemes.
Security Analysis: The security of the SSEDR protocol was dependent on the encryption
key’s size. In general, N needed to be at least 1024 bits long. One can then say that
the Paillier encryption scheme possessed semantic security. Thus, N in this proof was
assumed to be either 1024-bit or larger. The security guarantee in the semi-honest model
was quite easy to prove because the computations were performed on either encrypted data
or randomized data. The following steps were used to ensure the data are either protected
or never disclosed.
The computations are performed directly on each pair of Epk(xj) and Epk(yj) at
Step 1(a) of Algorithm 3. They were never decrypted, nor was information leaked regarding
X and Y , as long as the encryption scheme was semantically secure. The original data
could only be disclosed at Step 2(a) because decryption operations are performed on the
intermediate computation results. However, tj was uniformly distributed in ZN from the
viewpoint of P2 because tj = xj−yj+rj mod N and rj was randomly chosen and known only
to P1. Therefore, tj did not leak any information regarding X and Y to P2. The remaining
computations were based on either encrypted or randomized data. As a consequence, if P1
and P2 did not collude, no information related to either X or Y was ever disclosed to the
two parties. (Note that collusion was prohibited under the semi-honest model).
Complexity Analysis: The number of multiplications and encryptions was bounded by O(m),
where m is the vector size for the SSEDR protocol. Each step of the protocol needed to be
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examined before the upper bound could be derived. The protocol performed 2m encryptions
and 2m multiplications at Step 1. Although it was slightly less expensive than an encryption
operation, the Epk(yj)
N−1 was treated as one encryption. Step 2(a) involved performing m
decryptions. A decryption has a cost that is similar to an encryption. Thus, m encryptions
were counted for Step 2(a). Step 2(b) involved performing m encryptions and m multipli-
cations. Step 3(a) involved performing 3m encryptions and 2m multiplications. The two
exponentiations were counted as two encryptions. Step 3(b) required m− 1 multiplications.
The computations for the remaining steps were constant. Therefore, the total number of
multiplications and encryptions for this sub-protocol was bounded by O(m). Additionally,
because an encryption operation is generally several orders of magnitude more expensive
than a multiplication, this work can claim that the computation complexity of the SSEDR
protocol was bounded by O(m) encryptions.





and P2 holds the secret key (sk). Here, X and Y
are two m-dimensional binary vectors. The goal of the Secure Hamming Distance-Random
Share (SHDR) protocol is to securely compute the encryption of Hamming distance between
the two binary vectors, X and Y . During this protocol, no information regarding X and
Y is revealed to either P1 or P2. Let dh denote the Hamming distance between X and
Y . The output of this protocol returns two random shares (d′h and d′′h) such that d′h + d′′h
mod N = dh. Note that the random share d′h is known only to P1, whereas the random
share d′′h is known only to P2.
According to Equation 3.3, the main challenge is to compute xj ∗yj from Epk(xj) and
Epk(yj), where Epk(xj) and Epk(yj) are encryptions of xj and yj. The key steps to securely
compute the Hamming distance between the two binary vectors, X and Y , are given by
Algorithm 4, where the computations are only based on either encrypted or randomized
data. At Step 1(a) of the algorithm, tj1 and tj2 are randomizations of xj and yj, respectively,
and rj1 and rj2 are randomly chosen to hide the actual values of xj and yj. According to
the additive homomorphic property of the encryption scheme, Epk(tj1) and Epk(tj2) can be
computed as follows:






Require: P1 has Epk(X) and Epk(Y ); P2 has the decryption key
1: P1:
(a) Epk(tj1) ← Epk(xj + rj1) and Epk(tj2) ← Epk(yj + rj2), where rj1 , rj2 ∈R ZN and











(a) Perform decryption operation to get (t11 , t12), . . ., (tm1 , tm2)
(b) Compute Epk(t11 ∗ t12), . . . , Epk(tm1 ∗ tm2), and send them to P1
3: P1:
(a) Obtain Epk(xj · yj) by eliminating rj1 ∗ rj2 , rj2 ∗ xj, and rj1 ∗ yj from Epk(tj1 ∗ tj2),
for 1 ≤ j ≤ m
(b) Epk(dh)← Epk
(
m−∑mj=1 xj ∗ yj)
(c) Compute Epk(dh + r), where r ∈R ZN
(d) Set d′h = N − r and send Epk(dh + r) to P2
4: P2:
(a) Perform decryption on Epk(dh + r) to obtain dh + r
(b) Set d′′h = dh + r





to obtain (tj1 , tj2) at Step 2(a) because it has the decryp-
tion key. P2 computes the multiplication of tj1 ∗ tj2 . It sends then the encrypted results to
P1. Because P1 knows rj1 , rj2 , Epk(xj), and Epk(yj), it can easily compute Epk(rj1 ∗ rj2),
rj2 ∗xj, and rj1 ∗yj. In Step 3(a), since Epk(tj1 ∗tj2) = Epk(xj ∗yj+rj1 ∗rj2 +rj2 ∗xj+rj1 ∗yj),
P1 can obtain Epk(xj ∗ yj) by:
Epk(xj ∗ yj)← Epk(tj1 ∗ tj2) ∗ (Epk(rj1 ∗ rj2) ∗ Epk(rj2 ∗ xj) ∗ Epk(rj1 ∗ yj))N−1
From here, Epk(dh) can be directly derived at Step 3(b):
Epk(dh)← Epk(m) ∗
(
Epk(xj · yj) ∗ · · · ∗ Epk(xm · ym)
)N−1
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The rest of the steps are fairly obvious. All of the above computations are based on the
additive homomorphic property of the encryption schemes.
Security Analysis: The SHDR protocol has the same structure as the SSEDR protocol.
Therefore, it is secure under the semi-honest model as well.
Complexity Analysis: This work can claim that the computation complexity of SHDR was
bounded by O(m) encryptions. This asymptotic bound can be derived by following the
same steps as discuses in Section 3.5.3.
Justification for using AH-Enc to securely implement a distance: The SM protocol is the
main building block and the performance bottleneck for securely computing the distance in
both Euclidean and Hamming metrics. Therefore, the computation costs of two different
implementations of the SM protocol are analyzed and compared: homomorphic encryption
approach (SM-HE) and garbled circuit approach (SM-GC). The running times of the two
implementations were compared for varying number of bits required to perform multipli-
cation. The running time of each implementation was independent of the input size, and
the computation cost of SM-GC was significantly higher than that of SM-HE (see Table
3.2). For example, the computation time when SM-GC was used to multiply two 10-bit
numbers was 1.752 seconds. While in contrast was 0.02984 second when SM-HE is used.
Therefore, the homomorphic encryption approach was adopted to implement the distance
in both Euclidean and Hamming metrics.
3.5.5. Secure Bit-Decomposition. Assume that P1 has Epk(z) and P2 has sk,
where z is not known to both parties and 0 ≤ z < 2l, where l is referred to as the domain size
(in bits) of z. Given Epk(z), the Secure Bit-Decomposition (SBD) protocol [86, 87] protocol
is used primarily to compute the encryptions of the individual bits of binary representation
of z. The output [z] =
〈
Epk(z1), . . . , Epk(zl)
〉
is known only to P1 at the end, where z1 and
zl denote the most and least significant bits of z, respectively. During this process, neither
the value of z nor any zi’s is revealed either to P1 or P2. Since the goal of this work is
not to investigate existing SBD protocols, the most efficient SBD scheme that was recently
proposed in [86] is used in the proposed protocols.
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Share size Distance size SM-GC SM-HE
1024 10 1.752s 0.02984s
1024 20 1.792s 0.02985s
Table 3.2: Garbled circuit vs. homomorphic-based secure multiplication
Example 4. Assume z = 55 and l = 6. Then, the SBD protocol in [86] with input Epk(55)
returns [55] =
〈
Epk(1), Epk(1), Epk(0), Epk(1), Epk(1), Epk(1)
〉
as the output to P1. 
Security Analysis: The SBD protocol in “An efficient and probabilistic secure bit- decom-
position” [86] is secure under the semi-honest model.
Complexity Analysis: The computation complexity of the SBD protocol proposed in “An
efficient and probabilistic secure bit-decomposition” [86] was bounded by O(l) encryptions
(under the assumption that encryption and decryption operations based on the Paillier
cryptosystem [75] take similar amount of time) .





and P2 with (sk) securely compute Epk(o1 ∨ o2), where o1 and o2
are two bits. The output Epk(o1 ∨ o2) is known only to P1.
Security Analysis: The security of the SBOR depends solely on the underlying SM protocol.
This is because, the only step at which P1 and P2 interact in the SBOR protocol is during
the SM protocol. Since the SM is secure under the semi-honest model, this work claims
that the SBOR protocol is also secure under the semi-honest model.
Complexity Analysis: Since the SBOR protocol utilized the Secure Multiplication (SM)
protocol as a sub-routine, the computation cost of the Secure Bit-OR protocol was bounded
by (small) constant number of encryptions and multiplications.
3.5.7. Secure Minimum. Assume that in the Secure Minimum (SMIN) proto-







. Here, [u] =
〈




Epk(v1), . . . , Epk(vl)
〉
where
u1 (resp., v1) and ul (resp., vl) are the most and least significant bits of u (resp., v), re-
spectively. Here, su (resp., sv) denotes the secret corresponding to u (resp., v). The goal
of the SMIN is for P1 and P2 to jointly compute the encryptions of the individual bits of
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, the encryption of the secret corresponding to the minimum value of u and






, which will be known only to P1. No
information regarding the contents of u,v,su, or sv is revealed to either P1 or P2 during this
protocol.
The basic concept of the proposed SMIN protocol is that P1 randomly chooses the
functionality F by flipping a coin, where F is either u > v or v > u and obliviously executes
F with P2. The result of the functionality F is oblivious to P2 because F is randomly







locally using homomorphic properties.
The overall steps involved in the SMIN protocol are shown in Algorithm 5. P1
initially chooses the functionality F as either u > v or v > u randomly. P1 then uses the
SM protocol, with the help of P2, to compute Epk(ui ∗ vi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. P1 then follows
several steps for 1 ≤ i ≤ l:
• Use Ti = Epk(ui) ∗ Epk(vi) ∗ Epk(ui ∗ vi)N−2 to compute the encrypted bit-wise XOR
between the bits ui and vi. In general, for any two given bits (o1 and o2), the property
o1 ⊕ o2 = o1 + o2 − 2(o1 ∗ o2) always holds.
• Compute an encrypted vector H by preserving the first occurrence of Epk(1) (if there
exists one) in T by initializing H0 = Epk(0). The remaining H entries are computed
as Hi = Hrii−1 ∗Ti. At most one of the entries in H is Epk(1), and the remaining entries
are encryptions of either 0 or a random number.
• P1 then computes Φi = Epk(−1) ∗Hi. Note that, “−1” is equivalent to “N − 1” under
ZN . Here, Φi = Epk(0) occurs at most once because Hi is equal to Epk(1) occurs at
most once. Additionally, if Φj = Epk(0), then index j is the position at which the bits
of u and v differ first (beginning at the most significant bit position).
P1 creates two encrypted vectors (W and Γ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ l as follows:
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Algorithm 5 SMIN(u′, v′)→ [min(u, v)], Epk(smin(u,v))








, where 0 ≤ u, v < 2l; P2 has sk
1: P1:
(a). Randomly choose the functionality F
(b). for i = 1 to l do:




• Ti ← Epk(ui ⊕ vi)
• Hi ← Hrii−1 ∗ Ti; ri ∈R ZN and H0 = Epk(0)
• Φi ← Epk(−1) ∗Hi
• if F : u > v then:
Wi ← Epk(ui) ∗ Epk(ui ∗ vi)N−1 and Γi ← Epk(vi − ui) ∗ Epk(rˆi); rˆi ∈R ZN
else Wi ← Epk(vi) ∗ Epk(ui ∗ vi)N−1 Γi ← Epk(ui − vi) ∗ Epk(rˆi); rˆi ∈R ZN






(c). if Epk(su) and Epk(su) 6= Nil then
• if F : u > v then: δ ← Epk(sv − su) ∗ Epk(r¯)
• else δ ← Epk(su − sv) ∗ Epk(r¯), where r¯ ∈R ZN
(d). Γ′ ← pi1(Γ) and L′ ← pi2(L)
(e). Send δ,Γ′ and L′ to P2
2: P2:
(a). Receive δ,Γ′ and L′ from P1
(b). Decryption: Mi ← Dsk(L′i), for 1 ≤ i ≤ l
(c). if ∃ j such that Mj = 1 then α← 1 else α← 0
(d). if α = 0 then:
• M ′i ← Epk(0), for 1 ≤ i ≤ l
• if δ′ 6= nil then δ′ ← Epk(0)
else
• M ′i ← Γ
′α
i ∗ rN , where r ∈R ZN and is different for 1 ≤ i ≤ l
• if δ′ 6= nil then δ′ ← δ ∗ rNδ , where rδ ∈R ZN
(e). Send M ′, Epk(α) and δ′ to P1
3: P1:
(a). Receive M ′, Epk(α) and δ′ from P2
(b). M˜ ← pi−11 (M ′) and θ ← δ′ ∗ Epk(α)N−r¯
(c). λi ← M˜i ∗ Epk(α)N−rˆi , for 1 ≤ i ≤ l




)← Epk(ui) ∗ λi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l





)← Epk(vi) ∗ λi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l
• if Epk(sv) 6= nil then Epk
(
smin(u,v)
)← Epk(sv) ∗ θ else Epk(smin(u,v))← nil
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• If F : u > v,
Wi = Epk(ui) ∗ Epk(ui ∗ vi)N−1
= Epk
(
ui ∗ (1− vi)
)
Γi = Epk(vi − ui) ∗ Epk(rˆi)
= Epk(vi − ui + rˆi)
• If F : v > u,
Wi = Epk(vi) ∗ Epk(ui ∗ vi)N−1
= Epk
(
vi ∗ (1− ui)
)
Γi = Epk(ui − vi) ∗ Epk(rˆi)
= Epk(ui − vi + rˆi)
where rˆi is a random number (hereafter denoted by ∈R) in ZN . Observe that if F : u > v,
thenWi = Epk(1) iff ui > vi. Otherwise,Wi = Epk(0). Similarly, when F : v > u, thenWi =
Epk(1) iff vi > ui. Otherwise Wi = Epk(0). Also dependent on F , Γi stores the encryption
of the randomized difference between ui and vi, which is used in later computations.




where r′i is a random number in ZN . The observation here is if ∃ an index j such that
Φj = Epk(0), denoting the first flip in the bits of u and v, then Wj stores the corresponding
desired information (i.e., whether uj > vj or vj > uj) in encrypted form. Dependent on F ,
P1 also computes the encryption of the randomized difference between su and sv, storing it in
δ. More specifically, if F : u > v, then δ = Epk(sv−su+ r¯). Otherwise, δ = Epk(su−sv + r¯),
where r¯ ∈R ZN .
P1 next uses two random permutation functions functions (pi1 and pi2) to permute the
encrypted vectors Γ and L. More specifically, he/she computes Γ′ = pi1(Γ) and L′ = pi2(L)
and then sends them, along with δ, to P2. Upon receiving, P2 decrypts L′ component-wise
to obtain Mi = Dsk(L′i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ l and checks for index j. That is, if Mj = 1, then P2
sets α to 1. Otherwise, he/she sets α to 0. P2 also computes a new encrypted vector (M ′)
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depending on the value of α. Precisely, If α = 0, then M ′i = Epk(0) for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. Here,
Epk(0) is different for each i. In contrast, when α = 1, P2 sets M ′i to the re-randomized
value of Γ′i. That is, M ′i = Γ
′α
i ∗ rN , where the term rN comes from the re-randomization
and r ∈R ZN should be different for each i. Re-randomization property means that any one
can alter a ciphertext for a plaintext into a new ciphertext in an unlinkable way, such that
both ciphertexts will decrypt to the same original plaintext [78]. Furthermore, P2 computes
δ′ = Epk(0) if α = 0. However, when α = 1, P2 sets δ′ to δ ∗ rNδ , where rδ is a random
number in ZN . P2 then sends M ′, Epk(α) and δ′ to P1. After receiving M ′, Epk(α), and
δ′, P1 computes the inverse permutation of M ′ as M˜ = pi−11 (M ′). P1 then performs the





for 1 ≤ i ≤ l:
• Remove the randomness from M˜i by computing λi = M˜i ∗ Epk(α)N−rˆi




= Epk(ui) ∗ λi = Epk
(







= Epk(vi) ∗ λi = Epk
(
vi + α ∗ (ui − vi)
)
.













= Epk(sv) ∗ θ.
One main observation in the SMIN protocol, (upon which the correctness of the
final output can be justify) is that, if F : u > v, then min(u, v)i = (1 − α) ∗ ui + α ∗ vi
always holds for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. In contrast, if F : v > u, then min(u, v)i = α ∗ ui + (1− α) ∗ vi
always holds. Similar conclusions can be drawn for smin(u,v). Similar formulations can








. Multiple secrets of u and v can also be fed as input (in encrypted
form) to SMIN and SMAX. For example, let s1u and s2u (resp., s1v and s2v) be two secrets




























Example 5. For simplicity, consider that u = 55, v = 58, and l = 6. Suppose su and sv







. Additionally, assume that P1’s random permutation functions are as given
in Table 3.3. Suppose P1 chooses the functionality F : v > u without loss of generality.
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Table 3.3: P1’s random permutation functions
i = 1 2 3 4 5 6
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
pi1(i) = 6 5 4 3 2 1
pi2(i) = 2 1 5 6 3 4
Then, various intermediate results based on the SMIN protocol are as given in Table 3.4.
These results lead to the following observations’:
• One of the entries in H is , at most Epk(1), namely, H3 and the remaining entries
are encryptions of either 0 or a random number in ZN .
• Index j = 3 is the first position at which the corresponding bits of u and v differ.
• Because H3 is equal to Epk(1), Φ3 = Epk(0). Additionally, because M5 = 1, P2 sets α
to 1.
• Epk(smin(u,v)) = Epk
(
α ∗ su + (1− α) ∗ sv
)
= Epk(su).









Security Analysis: According to Algorithm 5, the execution image of P2 is denoted by
ΠP2(SMIN), where
ΠP2(SMIN) =
{〈δ, s+ r¯ mod N〉, 〈Γ′i, µi + rˆi mod N〉, 〈L′i, α〉}
Observe that s + r¯ mod N and µi + rˆi mod N are derived upon decrypting δ and Γ′i for
1 ≤ i ≤ l, respectively. Note that the modulo operator is implicit in the decryption function.
Also, P2 receives L′ from P1. Let α denote the (oblivious) comparison result computed from
L′. Without loss of generality, suppose the simulated image of P2 be denoted by ΠSP2(SMIN),
where
ΠSP2(SMIN) =
{〈δ∗, r∗〉, 〈s′1,i, s′2,i〉, 〈s′3,i, α′〉 | for 1 ≤ i ≤ l}
Here, δ∗, s′1,i and s′3,i are randomly generated from ZN2 , whereas r∗ and s′2,i are randomly
generated from ZN . Additionally, α′ denotes a random bit. Since Epk is a semantically secure
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Table 3.4: SMIN example: P1 chooses F as v > u, where u = 55 and v = 58




i Mi λi mini
1 1 0 r 0 0 −1 r 1 + r r r 0 1
1 1 0 r 0 0 −1 r r r r 0 1
0 1 1 −1 + r 1 1 0 1 1 + r r r −1 0
1 0 0 1 + r 1 r r r −1 + r r r 1 1
1 1 0 r 0 r r r r 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 + r 1 r r r r r r 1 1
*All column values except those inMi column are in encrypted form. Additionally, r ∈R ZN which
is different for each row and column.
encryption scheme a with resulting ciphertext size that is less than N2, δ is computation-
ally indistinguishable from δ∗. Similarly, Γ′i and L′i are computationally indistinguishable
from s′1,i and s′3,i, respectively. Also, as r¯ and rˆi are randomly generated from ZN , both
s + r¯ mod N and µi + rˆi mod N are computationally indistinguishable from r∗ and s′2,i,
respectively. Furthermore, because the functionality is randomly chosen by P1 (at Step 1(a)
of Algorithm 5), α is either 0 or 1 with equal probability. Thus, α is computationally indis-
tinguishable from α′. Putting the above results together, and following from Definition 1,
it was concluded that ΠP2(SMIN) was computationally indistinguishable from ΠSP2(SMIN).
This implies that, during the execution of the SMIN protocol, P2 does not learn any infor-
mation regarding either u, v, su, sv, or the actual comparison result. Intuitively speaking,
the information that P2 has during an execution of the SMIN protocol is either random
or pseudo-random, so this information does not disclose anything regarding u, v, su, or sv.
Additionally, as F is known only to P1, the actual comparison result is oblivious to P2.
In contrast, the execution image of P1, denoted by ΠP1(SMIN), is given by
ΠP1(SMIN) =
{
M ′i , Epk(α), δ
′ | for 1 ≤ i ≤ l}
Here, M ′i , and δ′ are encrypted values, which are random in ZN2 , received from P2
(at Step 3(a) of Algorithm 5). Let the simulated image of P1 be denoted by ΠSP1(SMIN),
where
ΠSP1(SMIN) = {s′4,i, b′, b′′ | for 1 ≤ i ≤ l}
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Values s′4,i, b′ and b′′ are randomly generated from ZN2 . Since Epk is a semantically se-
cure encryption scheme with a resulting ciphertext size of less than N2, it implies that
both M ′i , Epk(α) and δ′ are computationally indistinguishable from s4,i, b′ and b′′, respec-
tively. Therefore, ΠP1(SMIN) is computationally indistinguishable from ΠSP1(SMIN) based
on Definition 1. As a result, P1 cannot learn any information regarding u, v, su, sv, or the
comparison result during the execution of the SMIN. Putting everything together, and fol-
lowing from Definition 1, it was concluded that the SMIN protocol was secure under the
semi-honest model.
Complexity Analysis: Recall that, under Paillier’s encryption scheme, a decryption opera-
tion had almost the same cost as an encryption operation and an exponentiation operation
treated as an encryption operation. Additionally, because an encryption operation is gen-
erally several orders of magnitude more expensive than a multiplication, it was concluded
that the computation complexity of the Secure Minimum protocol was bounded by O(l)
encryptions. This asymptotic bound can be derived by following the same techniques used
to prove the previous sub-protocols.
3.5.8. Secure Minimum out of n Numbers. Consider P1 with n encrypted
vectors
(
[d1], . . . , [dn]
)
along with their encrypted secrets and P2 with sk, where 0 ≤ di < 2l
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Here, [di] =
〈
Epk(di,1), . . . , Epk(di,l)
〉
, where di,1 and di,l are the most and
least significant bits of integer di, respectively, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Here, the secret of di is
denoted by sdi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The primary goal of the Secure Minimum Out of n Numbers
(SMINn) protocol is to compute
[






along with the encryption of the








without revealing any information about di’s and their secrets to either P1 or P2. . This
work constructed a new SMINn protocol by utilizing the SMIN protocol as the building
block. The proposed SMINn protocol is an iterative approach that computes the desired
output in a hierarchical fashion. In each iteration, both the minimum between a pair of
values and the secret that corresponds to the minimum value are computed (in encrypted
form) and fed as input to the next iteration. That will generate a binary execution tree in
a bottom-up fashion. At the end, only P1 knows the final results [dmin] and Epk(sdmin). The


















; P2 has sk
1: P1:
(a). [d′i]← [di] and s′i ← Epk(sdi), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
(b). num← n
2: for i = 1 to dlog2 ne:









































Initially, P1 assigns both [di] and Epk(sdi) to a temporary vector [d′i] and variable s′i
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, respectively. Also, he/she creates a global variable (num) and initializes it to
n, where num represents the number of (non-zero) vectors involved in each iteration. Since
the SMINn protocol executes in a binary tree hierarchy (bottom-up fashion), it has dlog2 ne
iterations. In each iteration, the number of vectors involved varies. In the first iteration












, and P2 with sk involve in
the SMIN protocol, for 1 ≤ j ≤ ⌊num
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⌋

















and s′min(d′2j−1,d′2j) in [d
′
2j−1] and s′2j−1, respectively.







During the ith iteration, only the non-zero vectors (along with the corresponding
encrypted secrets) are involved in the SMIN protocol for 2 ≤ i ≤ dlog2 ne. For example,












, and so on are involved.











min(d1, . . . , dn)
])
, which is stored in [d′1], to [dmin]. P1 also assigns s′1
to Epk(sdmin).
Example 6. Suppose that P1 holds
〈
[d1], . . . , [d6]
〉
(i.e., n = 6). For simplicity, it is assuming
that there are no secrets associated with di’s. Then, based on SMINn protocol, the binary
execution tree (in a bottom-up fashion) to compute
[
min(d1, . . . , d6)
]
is shown in Figure 3.1.
Note that, [d′i] is initially set to [di] for 1 ≤ i ≤ 6. 
Security Analysis: According to Algorithm 6, it is clear that the SMINn protocol uses
SMIN protocol as a building block in an iterative manner. As proved in Section 3.5.7, the
SMIN protocol is secure under the semi-honest model. Also, the output of SMIN which
is passed as input to the next iteration in the SMINn protocol is in encrypted format.
Note that the SMINn protocol is solely based on SMIN and there are no other interactive
steps between P1 and P2. Hence, by composition theorem [40], it was concluded that the
sequential combination of the SMIN routines led to the proposed SMINn protocol that
guarantees security under the semi-honest model.
Complexity Analysis: Recall that, under Paillier’s encryption scheme [75], a decryption
operation had almost the same cost as an encryption operation and an exponentiation op-
eration treated as an encryption operation. Additionally, because an encryption operation
is generally several orders of magnitude more expensive than a multiplication, it was con-
cluded that the computation complexity of the Secure Minimum Out of n Numbers protocol
was bounded by O(l ∗ n ∗ log2 n) encryptions, where l referred as the domain size (in bits).
log2 n because the SMINn protocol executed in a binary tree hierarchy (bottom-up fashion).











































Figure 3.1: Binary execution tree for n = 6 based on the SMINn
3.5.9. Secure Frequency. Consider a situation where P1 holds private input(〈










and P2 holds the secret key sk. The Se-
cure Frequency (SF) protocol is used primarily to securely compute the encryption of the




, in the list 〈c′1, . . . , c′k〉, for 1 ≤ j ≤ w. Here, f(cj)
denotes the number of times element cj occurs (i.e., frequency) in the list 〈c′1, . . . , c′k〉. Here,









is revealed only to P1. During the SF protocol, neither c′i nor
cj is revealed to either P1 or P2. Additionally, f(cj) is kept private from both P1 and P2 for
1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ w.
The overall steps involved in the proposed SF protocol are presented in Algorithm
7. P1 initially computes an encrypted vector Si such that Si,j = Epk(cj − c′i) for 1 ≤ j ≤ w.
P1 then randomizes Si component-wise to obtain S ′i,j = Epk
(
ri,j ∗ (cj − c′i)
)
where ri,j is a
random number in ZN . P1 next uses a random permutation function pii (known only to P1)
to randomly permutes S ′i component-wise for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The output Zi ← pii(S ′i) is sent to
P2. Upon receiving, P2 decrypts Zi component-wise, computes a vector ui, and proceeds as
follows:
• If Dsk(Zi,j) = 0, then ui,j is set to 1. Otherwise, ui,j is set to 0.
• The observation is, since c′i ∈ {c1, . . . , cw}, that exactly one of the entries in vector Zi
is an encryption of 0 and the rest are encryptions of random numbers. This further
implies that exactly one of the decrypted values of Zi is 0 and the rest are random












Require: P1 has Λ =
〈

















(a). for i = 1 to k do:
• Ti ← Epk(c′i)N−1
• for j = 1 to w do:
– Si,j ← Epk(cj) ∗ Ti
– S ′i,j ← Si,jri,j , where ri,j ∈R ZN
• Zi ← pii(S ′i)
(b). Send Z to P2
2: P2:
(a). Receive Z from P1
(b). for i = 1 to k do
• for j = 1 to w do:
– if Dsk(Zi,j) = 0 then ui,j ← 1
else ui,j ← 0
– Ui,j ← Epk(ui,j)
(c). Send U to P1
3: P1:
(a). Receive U from P2




)←∏ki=1 Vi,j, for 1 ≤ j ≤ w
• Compute Ui,j = Epk(ui,j) and send it to P1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ w.
P1 then performs row-wise inverse permutation on it to obtain Vi = pi−1i (Ui) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.






i=1 Vi,j locally for 1 ≤ j ≤ w.







(2), Epk(3), Epk(2), Epk(5), Epk(2)
〉
(i.e., w = 3 and k = 6). For simplicity, it is assuming
that P1 has only one random function which is as given in Table 3.5. Then, based on SF
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Table 3.5: SF example: P1’s random permutation function
i = 1 2 3
↓ ↓ ↓
pi(i) = 3 1 2
protocol, the various intermediate results based on the SF protocol are given in Tables 3.6



























Epk(0) ∗ Epk(0) ∗ Epk(0) ∗ Epk(1) ∗ Epk(0) = Epk(1). Thus, the output of the SF to P1 is
〈Epk(3), Epk(2), Epk(1)〉 
Security Analysis: Let the execution image of the SF for P2 is denoted by ΠP2(SF), and is
given as (according to Algorithm 7)
ΠP2(SF) = {Zi,j, ui,j | for 1 ≤ j ≤ w}
where ui,j is derived upon decrypting Zi,j (at step 2(b) of Algorithm 7). Suppose that the
simulated image of P2 is denoted by ΠSP2(SF) which can be given by
ΠSP2(SF) = {Z∗i,j, u∗i,j | for 1 ≤ j ≤ w}
Here, Z∗i,j is randomly generated from ZN2 . Also, u∗i is a vector generated at random such
that exactly one of them is 0, and the rest are random numbers in ZN . Since Epk is a
semantically secure encryption scheme with a resulting ciphertext size that is less than N2,
Zi,j is computationally indistinguishable from Z∗i,j. Also, since pii is a random permutation
function known only to P1, ui will be a vector with exactly one zero (at random location)
and the rest are random numbers in ZN . Hence, ui is computationally indistinguishable
from u∗i . Thus, it was concluded that ΠP2(SF) was computationally indistinguishable from
ΠSP2(SF).
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Table 3.6: SF example: Vectors Si,j and Zi,j, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k = 6 and 1 ≤ j ≤ w = 3
c′i
c j
Si,j 3 2 3 2 5 2 Zi,j 3 2 3 2 5 2
2 -1 0 -1 0 -3 0
c j
5 0 r2,2 0 r2,4 r2,5 r2,6
3 0 1 0 1 -2 1 1 r3,1 r3,2 r3,3 r3,4 0 r3,6
5 2 3 2 3 0 3 3 r1,1 0 r1,3 0 r1,5 0
Table 3.7: SF example: Vector Vi,j, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k = 6 and 1 ≤ j ≤ w = 3
c′i
c j
Vi,j 3 2 3 2 5 2
2 Epk(0) Epk(1) Epk(0) Epk(1) Epk(0) Epk(1)
3 Epk(1) Epk(0) Epk(1) Epk(0) Epk(0) Epk(0)
5 Epk(0) Epk(0) Epk(0) Epk(0) Epk(1) Epk(0)
In contrast, let the execution image of P1 is denoted by ΠP1(SF), and is given by
ΠP1(SF) = {Ui,j | for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ w}
Here, Ui,j is an encrypted value sent by P2 at step 2(c) of Algorithm 7. Suppose that the
simulated image of P1 is given by
ΠSP1(SF) = {U∗i,j | for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ w}
where U∗i,j is a random number in ZN2 . Since Epk is a semantically secure encryption scheme
with a resulting ciphertext size of less thanN2, Ui,j is computationally indistinguishable from
U∗i,j. As a result, ΠP1(SF) is computationally indistinguishable from ΠSP1(SF). Combining
all the above results, and following from Definition 1, it was concluded that the SF protocol
was secure under the semi-honest model.
Complexity Analysis: This work can claim that the computation complexity of the SF
protocol was bounded by O(k ∗w) encryptions. This upper bound can be derived the same
way that used in the previous sub-routines.
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3.5.10. Secure Comparison with a Threshold. In the Secure Comparison with
a Threshold (SCT) protocol, P1 holds a private input (d′) and P2 holds a private input
(d′′). Here, d′ and d′′ are two random shares for d such that d′ + d′′ mod N = d. Given
a threshold t as a publicly known parameter, the goal of the SCT protocol is to securely
evaluate the condition d < t. The output of this protocol returns two random shares (b′
and b′′) for b such that b′ + b′′ mod N = b, where b denotes the comparison result. More
specifically, b = 0 if d < t, otherwise, b = 0. Note that the random share b′ is revealed only
to P1, whereas the random share b′′ is revealed only to P2.
The inputs received from most existing, secure, comparison protocols [9, 25, 26, 35,
71] are either non-encrypted or non-random shares. Thus, they are not directly applicable
to this problem domain. In contrast, garbled circuit has been known for its efficiency
in securely evaluating simple functionalities (e.g., comparison). Additionally, the garbled
circuit requires only one round of communication. As a result, it can easily be modified
to fit this problem domain. Therefore, Garbled Circuit Parser tool (GCParser) [65],
an interpreter for garbled circuits intermediate language, was adopted in this study to
implement the SCT protocol. Technical details on how to produce and evaluate a garbled
circuit have been well documented in “Faster secure two-party computation using garbled
circuits” [53].
Security Analysis: The SCT protocol was implemented using a garbled circuit, which was
also secure under the semi-honest model [53].
Complexity Analysis: Inputs to the SCT protocol were two random shares with a size that
bounded by N . Thus, the initial phase of the garbled circuit needed O(logN) gates to add
the shares. The resulting distance value was much smaller than N in the problem domain.
Therefore, the total number of gates in the garbled circuit was bound by O(logN). Since
the fast garbled circuit evaluation method proposed in “Faster secure two-party computation
using garbled circuits” [53] is very efficient and use a symmetric key encryption to garble
the circuit. One can expect that the total computation cost of the SCT protocol is about
performing several homomorphic encryption operations. Thus, O(m) encryptions provided
an appropriate upper bound for the SCT protocol.
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3.6. OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED PRIVACY-PRESERVING QUERY
PROCESSING PROTOCOLS
According to the number of participants, an SMC protocol can be classified into
either two-party or multi-party protocol. In this work, it is more cost effective to use two
cloud service providers, so one will focus on developing two-party Privacy-Preserving Query
Processing (PPQP) protocol.
Let C1 denote a cloud service provider who stores Alice’s encrypted data (T ′) and per-
forms query processing based on T ′ and a user query (q) on behalf of her. When outsourced
data (T ′) are encrypted with a fully homomorphic encryption scheme [13, 14, 36, 38, 93],
C1 can perform any possible computations over the encrypted data. Fully homomorphic en-
cryptions, however, have yet to be practical due to their extremely high computation costs.
The research community is still looking for more efficient constructions of fully homomorphic
encryptions. Therefore, in addition to C1, this work will utilize another independent cloud
service provider (C2) and use an Additive Homomorphic Public Key Encryption (AH-Enc)
scheme to encrypt each records in T and q component-wise to produce T ′ and Epk(q). There
are several AH-Enc schemes, and without loss of generality, this work adopted the Paillier
cryptosystem [75] for its simple implementation and being semantically secure. Both C1
and C2 are assumed to be semi-honest cloud service providers. Such an assumption is not
new and has been commonly used in the recent related works (e.g., [15, 95]). The intu-
ition behind such an assumption is as follows: Most of the cloud service providers in the
market are legitimate, well-known IT companies (e.g., Google, Amazon, and Microsoft).
These companies maintain reputations that are invaluable assets that need to be protected
at all costs. Therefore, a collusion between them is highly unlikely as it will damage their
reputations which in turn can affect their revenues and profits.
Under this setting, Alice outsources her encrypted database (T ′) to C1, and the secret
key (sk) to C2. Here, it is possible for Alice to replace C2 with her private server. However,
if Alice has a private server, one can argue that there is no need for data outsourcing from
Alice’s point of view. The main purpose of using C2 can be motivated by the following
two reasons: (i) With limited computing resource and technical expertise, it is in the best
interest of Alice to completely outsource her data management and operational tasks to a
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cloud. For example, Alice may want to access her data and analytical results using either a
smart phone or any device with very limited computing capability. (ii) If Alice uses a private
server, she has to perform computations assumed by C2 under which the very purpose of
outsourcing the encrypted data to C1 is negated. Moreover, she might be able to track
down Bob’s queries and infer what he is looking for. Thus, Bob’s query privacy and access
patterns may be compromised while searching through hosted data within the cloud and
Alice’ private server.
In general, whether Alice uses either a private server or a cloud service provider (C2)
actually depends on her resources. This work preferred to use a multi-cloud computing
framework as this would avoid the above-mentioned disadvantages (i.e., in case of Alice
using a private server) altogether.
Note that Bob sends only his encrypted query and never participates in any inter-
mediate computations. Thus, how the user behaves is irrelevant to the protocol’s security.
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4. k-NEAREST NEIGHBOR QUERY
Using encryption as a way to achieve data confidentiality may cause another issue
during the query processing step in the cloud. In general, it is very difficult to process
encrypted data without ever having to decrypt it. The question here is how the cloud can
execute the queries over encrypted data while the data stored at the cloud are encrypted at
all times. In the literature, various techniques related to query processing over encrypted
data have been proposed, including range queries [49, 50, 91] and other aggregate queries
[46, 68]. These techniques, however, are either not applicable or inefficient to solve advanced
queries such as the kNN query.
In this chapter, the problem of secure processing of kNN (SkNN) query over en-
crypted relational data in a cloud was addressed [29]. That is, given a user’s encrypted
query record (q), the objective of the SkNN problem is to securely identify the top k-nearest
(closest) records to q using the encrypted database (T ′) in the cloud without allowing the
cloud to learn anything regarding either the actual contents of the database (T ) or q. More
specifically, an effective SkNN protocol needs to satisfy the following properties:
• Preserve the confidentiality of T and q at all times
• Hiding data access patterns from the cloud
• Accurately compute the k-nearest neighbors of query q
• Incur low computation overhead on the end-user
Various techniques related to solving the SkNN problem have been proposed [51, 98, 99, 105].
The existing SkNN methods violate, however, at least one of the above-mentioned desirable
properties of a SkNN protocol. On one hand, the methods in [51, 98] are insecure because
they are vulnerable to chosen and known plaintext attacks. On the other hand, the recent
method in [99] returns a non-accurate kNN result to the end-user. More precisely, in [99],
the cloud retrieves the relevant encrypted partition instead of finding the encrypted exact k-
nearest neighbors. Furthermore, in [51, 99, 105], the end-user involves in heavy computations
during the query processing step. By doing so, these methods utilize cloud as just a storage
medium, i.e., no significant work is done on the cloud side. Additionally, the existing SkNN
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methods do not protect data access patterns from the cloud. More details regarding the
existing SkNN methods were provided in Section 2.1.
This chapter presented first a basic scheme to solve SkNN problem and demonstrated
that such a naive solution was not secure. To provide better security, a novel maximum
SkNN protocol was also proposed that protected both the data confidentiality and the access
patterns [29]. For ease of presentation, some common notations that are used extensively
throughout this chapter are summarized in Table 4.1.
4.1. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
Suppose that Alice owns a database T of n records t1, . . . , tn and m attributes.
Let ti,j denote the jth attribute value of record ti. Also, assume that Alice generates a
pair of public-secret key pair (pk, sk) based on an Additive Homomorphic Public Key
Encryption (AH-Enc) cryptosystem that is semantically secure (e.g., Paillier cryptosystem
[75]). Initially, Alice encrypts her database (T ). Let T ′ =
{
Epk(t1), . . . , Epk(tn)
}
denote the
encryption of T , where each Epk(ti) is encrypted component-wise. That is, she computes
Epk(ti,j) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m, where Epk denotes the encryption function of a
public-key cryptosystem that is semantically secure [75]. Assume that Alice outsources both
T ′ and the future querying processing services to the cloud.
Consider Bob who wants to ask the cloud for k-neighbor records that are closest to
his input query q = 〈q1, . . . , qm〉 based on T ′, where m denotes the number of attributes.
During this process, neither Bob’s query (q) nor the database’s contents (T ) should be
revealed to the cloud. Access patterns for the data should also be protected from the cloud.
This process is referred to here as a Secure k-Nearest Neighbor (SkNN) query over encrypted
relational data in the cloud [29]. Let {t′1, . . . , t′k} denote the k-nearest records to q. The




)→ {t′1, . . . , t′k}
At the end of the SkNN protocol, the output {t′1, . . . , t′k} should be revealed only to Bob.
The following example presented a real-life application of the SkNN protocol.
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Table 4.1: Common notations used in the SkNN protocols
Alice The data owner of relational database T
Bob An authorized user who can access T ′ in the cloud
C1, C2 Two non-colluding semi-honest cloud service providers〈
Epk(.), Dsk(.)
〉 A pair of Paillier’s encryption and decryption functions with
(pk, sk) as public-secret key pair
Epk(x) Component-wise encryption of x: Epk(x1), . . . , Epk(xm)
T A relational database with n records: t1, . . . , tn
T ′ An encryption of T : Epk(t1), . . . , Epk(tn)
n Number of data records in T
m Number of attributes in T
ti i
th record in T
q Bob’s input query record
t′i i
th nearest record to q based on T
Example 8. Consider a physician who wants to know the risk factor of heart disease in a
specific patient. Let T denote the sample heart disease dataset with attributes record-id, age,
sex, cp, trestbps, chol, fbs, slope, ca, thal, and num as shown in Table 4.2. The description
and range for each of these attributes are shown in Table 4.3. The heart disease dataset
given in Table 4.2 is obtained from the UCI machine learning repository [56]. Initially,
the data owner (hospital) encrypts T attribute-wise, outsources the encrypted database T ′
to the cloud for easy management. Additionally, the data owner delegates the future query
processing services to the cloud. Now, we consider a doctor working at the hospital, say
Bob, who would like to know the risk factor of heart disease in a specific patient based on
T . Let the patient medical information be q = 〈58, 1, 4, 133, 196, 1, 2, 1, 6〉. In the SkNN
protocol, Bob first need to encrypt q (to preserve the privacy of his query) and send it to
the cloud. The cloud then searches on the encrypted database T ′ to figure out the k-Nearest
Neighbors to the user’s request. For simplicity, let us assume k = 2. Under this case, the
2-nearest neighbors to q are t4 and t5 (by using Euclidean distance as the similarity metric).
The cloud then sends both t4 and t5 (in encrypted form) to Bob. Here, the cloud should
identify the nearest neighbors of q in an oblivious manner without knowing any sensitive
information, i.e., all the computations have to be carried over encrypted records. Finally,
Bob receives both t4 and t5 that will help him to make medical decisions. 
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Table 4.2: Sample heart disease dataset T
record-id age sex cp trestbps chol fbs slope ca thal num
t1 63 1 1 145 233 1 3 0 6 0
t2 56 1 3 130 256 1 2 1 6 2
t3 57 0 3 140 241 0 2 0 7 1
t4 59 1 4 144 200 1 2 2 6 3
t5 55 0 4 128 205 0 2 1 7 3
4.2. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS
A novel SkNN protocol to facilitate the kNN search over semantically encrypted
relational data is proposed [29]. Withing this protocol, Alice does not participate in any
computations once the encrypted data are outsourced to the cloud. Therefore, no informa-
tion is revealed to Alice. This protocol also meets the desired requirements discussed in
Section 1.2:
• Neither the contents of T nor any intermediate results should be revealed to the cloud.
• Bob’s query (q) should not be revealed to the cloud.
• The output {t′1, . . . , t′k} should be computed accurately and revealed only to Bob.
Additionally, no information other than {t′1, . . . , t′k} should be revealed to Bob.
• Incurs a low computational overhead on Bob after the encrypted query record is sent
to the cloud.
• Access patterns for the data (e.g., the records corresponding to the k-Nearest Neigh-
bors of q) should not be revealed to either Alice or the cloud to prevent any inference
attacks.
The intermediate results observed by the clouds in this protocol are either newly
generated, randomized encryptions or random numbers. Thus, the data records correspond
to the k-Nearest Neighbors of q are unknown to the cloud. Also, after Bob sends his
encrypted query record to the cloud, he stops involving in computations. Hence, data
access patterns are further protected from Bob. More details are given in Section 4.3.2.
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Table 4.3: Attribute description of heart disease dataset T
sex 1=male, 0=female
cp
chest pain type: 1=typical angina, 2=atypical angina,
3=non-anginal pain, 4=asymptomatic
trestbps resting blood pressure (mm Hg)
chol serum cholesterol in mg/dl
fbs fasting blood sugar > 120 mg/dl (1=true; 0=false)
slope
slope of the peak exercise ST segment
(1=upsloping, 2=flat, 3=downsloping)
ca number of major vessels (0-3) colored by fluoroscopy
thal 3=normal, 6=fixed defect, 7=reversible defect
num diagnosis of heart disease from 0 (no presence) to 4
4.3. THE PROPOSED SECURE k-NEAREST NEIGHBOR PROTOCOLS
A basic version of the SkNN protocol is first presented and demonstrated why such
a simple solution was not secure. Then, the second approach that achieved better security
under the semi-honest model is presented. Both protocols were constructed based on the
set of sub-components presented in Section 3.5 as building blocks.
In the SkNN protocols, the existence of two non-colluding semi-honest cloud service
providers, denoted by C1 and C2, which together form a federated cloud was assumed. Such
an assumption is not new and has been commonly used in the related problem domains
[16, 96]. More details are given in Section 3.6.
Recall that Alice’s database consists of n records, denoted by T = {t1, . . . , tn}, andm
attributes, where ti,j denotes the jth attribute value of record ti. Initially, Alice encrypts her
database attribute-wise using here public key pk. Let the encrypted database be denoted
by T ′. Assume that all attribute values and their Euclidean distances lie in [0, 2l).
Under this setting, Alice outsources her encrypted database (T ′) to C1, and the secret
key (sk) to C2. The goal of the proposed SkNN protocols is to retrieve the top k records
that are closest to a user’s query in an efficient, secure manner. Briefly, consider Bob who
wants to find k records that are closest to his query record q = 〈q1, . . . , qm〉 based on T ′ in
C1. Bob initially sends his query q (in encrypted form) to C1. After this, both C1 and C2
involve in a set of sub-protocols to securely retrieve (in encrypted form) the set of k records
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corresponding to the k-nearest neighbors of the input query q. At the end of the proposed
protocols, only Bob will receive the k-Nearest Neighbors to q as the output.
4.3.1. Basic Secure k-Nearest Neighbor Protocol. In the basic protocol, de-
noted by SkNNb, the desirable properties discussed in Section 1.2 are relaxed to produce
an efficient protocol (More details on this are given in the latter part of this section). The
overall steps involved in the SkNNb protocol are presented in Algorithm 8. Initially, Bob
encrypts his query (q) attribute-wise, that is, he computes Epk(q) =
〈
Epk(q1), . . . ,
Epk(qm)
〉





, and C2 with the secret key sk jointly involve in the Secure
Squared Euclidean Distance (SSED) protocol, where Epk(ti) =
〈
Epk(ti,1), . . . , Epk(ti,m)
〉
for
1 ≤ i ≤ n. The output of this step, denoted by Epk(di), is the encryption of squared Eu-
clidean distance between q and ti, i.e., di = |q − ti|2. Recall that, Epk(di) is known only to
C1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Note that computation of the exact Euclidean distance between encrypted
vectors is hard to achieve as it involves square root. In the kNN, however, it is sufficient



























. C2 then generates an
index list δ = 〈i1, . . . , ik〉 such that 〈di1 , . . . dik〉 are the top k smallest distances among
〈d1, . . . , dn〉. After this, C2 sends δ to C1. Upon receiving δ, C1 proceeds as follows:
• Select the encrypted records Epk(ti1), . . . , Epk(tik) as the k-nearest records to q and
randomize them attribute-wise. More specifically, C1 computes Epk(γj,h) = Epk(tij ,h)∗
Epk(rj,h) for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 1 ≤ h ≤ m. Here, rj,h is a random number in ZN and tij ,h
denotes the column h attribute value of the data record tij . C1 then send γj,h to C2,
and rj,h to Bob for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 1 ≤ h ≤ m.
Upon receiving γj,h, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 1 ≤ h ≤ m, C2 decrypts it to obtain γ′j,h = Dsk(γj,h)
and sends them to Bob. Note that due to randomization by C1, γ′j,h is always a random





)→ 〈t′1, . . . , t′k〉
Require: C1 has T ′; C2 has sk; Bob has q
1: Bob:
(a). Compute Epk(qj), for 1 ≤ j ≤ m
(b). Send Epk(q) =
〈
Epk(q1), . . . , Epk(qm)
〉
to C1
2: C1 and C2:
(a). C1 receives Epk(q) from Bob




























, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
(c). Generate δ ← 〈i1, . . . , ik〉, such that 〈di1 , . . . , dik〉 are the top k smallest distances
among 〈d1, . . . , dn〉
(d). Send δ to C1
4: C1:
(a). Receive δ from C2
(b). for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 1 ≤ h ≤ m do:
• γj,h ← Epk(tij ,h) ∗ Epk(rj,h), where rj,h ∈R ZN
• Send γj,h to C2 and rj,h to Bob
5: C2:
(a). for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 1 ≤ h ≤ m do:
• Receive γj,h from C1
• γ′j,h ← Dsk(γj,h); send γ′j,h to Bob
6: Bob:
(a). for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 1 ≤ h ≤ m do:
• Receive rj,h from C1 and γ′j,h from C2
• t′j,h ← γ′j,h − rj,h mod N
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Finally, upon receiving rj,h from C1 and γ′j,h from C2, Bob computes the attribute
values of jth nearest neighbor to q as t′j,h = γ′j,h−rj,h mod N for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 1 ≤ h ≤ m.
4.3.2. Maximally Secure k-Nearest Neighbor Protocol. The Basic Secure k-
Nearest Neighbor (SkNNb) protocol completely protected both the data confidentiality and
the user’s query privacy because the computations were performed on either encrypted data
or randomized data. It did reveal, however, the data access patterns to C1 and C2. That
is, both C1 and C2 knew which data records correspond to the k-Nearest Neighbors for any
given q. It also did reveal di values to C2. Leakage of such information, however, may not
be acceptable in privacy-sensitive applications (e.g., medical data).
Along with this direction, this work proposed a Maximally Secure k-Nearest Neighbor
(SkNNm) protocol under the semi-honest model, where m stands for maximally secure. The
desirable properties discussed in Section 1.2 are completely preserved in the SkNNm protocol.
The overall steps involved in the proposed SkNNm protocol are presented in Al-
gorithm 10. Bob initially sends his attribute-wise encrypted query q, that is, Epk(q) =〈
Epk(q1), . . . , Epk(qm)
〉




and C2 with the secret key sk jointly involve in the SSED protocol to compute Epk
(|q−ti|2)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The output Epk(di) = Epk
(|q − ti|2) will be known only to C1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Using the Secure Bit-Decomposition (SBD) protocol, both C1 with input Epk(di), and C2
with sk securely compute [di], the encryptions of the individual bits of di, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The output [di] =
〈
Epk(di,1), . . . , Epk(di,l)
〉
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n will be known only to
C1, where di,1 and di,l are the most and least significant bits of di, respectively. Note that
0 ≤ di < 2l for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
After this, both C1 and C2 compute the top k (in encrypted form) records that
are closest to q in an iterative manner. More specifically, they compute Epk(t′1) in the first
iteration, Epk(t′2) in the second iteration, and so on. Here, t′s denote the sth nearest neighbor









start with, in the first iteration, both C1 and C2 jointly compute the encryptions of the
individual bits of the minimum value among d1, . . . , dn using the Secure Minimum Out of n
Numbers (SMINn) protocol. That is, C1, with input (θ1, . . . , θn), and C2, with sk compute(
[dmin], nil
)









)→ 〈t′1, . . . , t′k〉
Require: C1 has T ′ and pi; C2 has sk; Bob has q
1: Bob sends Epk(q) =
〈
Epk(q1), . . . , Epk(qm)
〉
to C1
2: C1 and C2:
(a). C1 receives Epk(q) from Bob









3: for s = 1 to k do:
(a). C1 and C2:














• for i = 1 to n do:
– τi ← Epk(dmin) ∗ Epk(di)N−1
– τ ′i ← τ rii , where ri ∈R ZN
• β ← pi(τ ′); send β to C2
(c). C2:
• Receive β from C1
• β′i ← Dsk(βi), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
• Compute U , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
– if β′i = 0 then Ui = Epk(1)
– else Ui = Epk(0)
• Send U to C1
(d). C1:
• Receive U from C2 and compute V ← pi−1(U)























, for 1 ≤ γ ≤ l
The rest of the steps are similar to steps 4-6 of SkNNb
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among d1, . . . , dn. In this chapter, during the process of the SMINn protocol, the secret
information associated with each tuple does not involve in the computation. Therefore, the





is known only to C1. C1 then follows several steps:






= Epk(dmin,1 ∗ 2l−1 + · · ·+ dmin,l)
Where dmin,1 and dmin,l are the most and least significant bits of dmin, respectively.
• Compute the encryption of difference between dmin and each di. That is, C1 computes
τi = Epk(dmin) ∗ Epk(di)N−1 = Epk(dmin − di) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
• Randomize τi to obtain τ ′i = τ rii = Epk
(
ri ∗ (dmin − di)
)
, where ri is a random number
in ZN . Note that τ ′i is an encryption of either 0 or a random number for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Next, use a random permutation function pi (known only to C1) to permute τ ′ such
that β = pi(τ ′). Send β to C2.
Upon receiving β, C2 decrypts it component-wise to obtain β′i = Dsk(βi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. It
then computes an encrypted vector U of length n. If β′i = 0, then Ui = Epk(1); otherwise,
Ui = Epk(0). It is assumed here that exactly one of the entries in β equals to zero and
the remaining entries are random. This further implies that exactly one of the entries in
U is an encryption of 1 and the remaining entries are encryption of 0’s. However, if β′ has
more than one 0’s, then C2 can randomly pick one of those indexes and set Epk(1) to the
corresponding index of U , and Epk(0) to the rest. C2 then sends U to C1. After receiving
U , C1 performs inverse permutation on it to obtain V = pi−1(U). Note that exactly one of
the entries in V is Epk(1) and the remaining entries are encryption of 0’s. Additionally, if
Vi = Epk(1), then ti is the closest record to q. Both C1 and C2, however, do not know which
entry in V is corresponding to Epk(1).
C1 computes Epk(t′1), the encryption of the closest record to q, and updates the
distance vectors as follows:
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• Both C1 and C2 jointly involve in the Secure Multiplication (SM) protocol to compute
V ′i,j = Vi ∗Epk(ti,j) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. The output V ′ from the SM protocol
is known only to C1. After this, by using homomorphic properties, C1 computes
the encrypted record Epk(t′1) =
〈







where 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Note that, t′1,j denotes the jth attribute value of record t′1.
• It is important to note that the first nearest record to q should be obliviously ex-
cluded from further computations. However, because C1 does not know the record
corresponding to Epk(t′1), one need to obliviously eliminate the possibility of choosing
this record again in next iterations. For this, C1 obliviously updates the distance cor-
responding to Epk(t′1) to the maximum value, i.e., 2l−1. More specifically, C1 updates
the distance vectors with the help of C2 using the Secure Bit-OR (SBOR) protocol





Note that, when Vi = Epk(1), the corresponding distance vector di is set to the max-
imum value. That is, under this case, [di] =
〈
Epk(1), . . . , Epk(1)
〉
. However, when
Vi = Epk(0), the OR operation has no effect on di.
The above process is repeated for k iterations. In each iteration, [di], corresponding to
the currently chosen record, is set to the maximum value. However, because C1 and C2
do not know which [di] is updated, they have to re-compute Epk(di) in each iteration for
1 ≤ i ≤ n. In iteration s, Epk(t′s) is known only to C1. At the end of the iterative step (Step








, the list of encrypted records of k-Nearest
Neighbors to q.
The rest of the process is similar to steps 4 to 6 of Algorithm 8. Briefly, C1 randomizes
Epk(t
′
j) attribute-wise to obtain γj,h = Epk(t′j,h)∗Epk(rj,h). It sends γj,h to C2 and rj,h to Bob
for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 1 ≤ h ≤ m. Here, rj,h is a random number in ZN . Upon receiving γj,h’s,
C2 decrypts them to obtain the randomized k-nearest records as γ′j,h = Dsk(γj,h) and sends
them to Bob for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 1 ≤ h ≤ m. Finally, upon receiving rj,h from C1 and γ′j,h
from C2, Bob computes the jth nearest neighboring record to q, as t′j,h = γ′j,h − rj,h mod N
for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 1 ≤ h ≤ m.
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4.4. SECURITY ANALYSIS
First, due to the encryption of q and by semantic security of the Paillier cryptosystem,
Bob’s input query q was protected from Alice, C1, and C2 in both protocols. In the SkNNb
protocol, the decryption operations at step 3(b) of Algorithm 8 did reveal di values to C2.
Additionally, since C2 generates the top k index list (at step 3(c) of Algorithm 8) and sends
it to C1, the data access patterns are revealed to both C1 and C2. Therefore, the SkNNb
protocol was secure under the assumption that di values can be revealed to C2 and data
access patterns can be revealed to both C1 and C2.
In contrast, the security analysis of the SkNNm protocol is as follows. At step 2 of
Algorithm 10, the outputs of the SSED and SBD protocols were in encrypted format and
were known only to C1. Additionally, all the intermediate results decrypted by C2 in the
SSED protocol were uniformly random in ZN . Also, as discussed in [86], the SBD protocol
was secure. Thus, no information was revealed during step 2 of Algorithm 10. In each
iteration, the output of the SMINn protocol was known only to C1 and no information was
revealed to C2. Also, both C1 and C2 did not know which record belongs to the current
global minimum. Thus, data access patterns were protected from both C1 and C2. At step
3(c) of Algorithm 10, a component-wise decryption of β did reveal the tuples that satisfy
the current global minimum distance to C2. Due to permutation by C1, however, C2 could
not trace back to the corresponding data records. Note that, the decryption of β gave either
encryptions of 0’s or random numbers in ZN . Similarly, because U is an encrypted vector,
C1 could not know which record that corresponds to the current global minimum distance.
Thus, the data access patterns were further protected at this step from C1. Additionally,
the update process at step 3(e) of Algorithm 10 did not leak any information to either C1
or C2. In summary, both C1 and C2 did not know which data records that correspond to
the output set 〈t′1, . . . , t′k〉.
Following from the previous discussions, it was clear that the SkNNm protocol pro-
tected the data confidentiality, the privacy of a user’s input query, and hide the data access
patterns from C1 and C2. Also, since all these sub-protocols of the SkNNm protocol pro-
duced pseudo-random values as intermediate results, according to the Composition Theorem
[41] given in Definition 2, the SkNNm protocol is also secure under the semi-honest model.
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4.5. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
The proposed SkNNb and SkNNm protocols’ computation complexity were analyzed
under the assumption that encryption and decryption operations based on Paillier cryp-
tosystem take a similar amount of time, an exponentiation operation was treated as an
encryption operation, and an encryption operation is generally several orders of magnitude
more expensive than a multiplication.
The computation complexity of the SkNNb protocol was bounded by O(n ∗m + k)
encryptions. In practice, k  n ∗m; therefore, the computation complexity of the SkNNb
protocol could be bounded by O(n ∗m) encryptions.
In contrast, the computation complexity of the SkNNm protocol was bounded by
O(n) instantiations of the SBD and the SSED protocols, O(k) instantiations of the SMINn
protocol , and O(n ∗ l) instantiations of the SBOR protocol. Note that, the computation
complexity of the SBD protocol proposed in [86] was bounded by O(l) encryptions. Also,
the computation complexity of the SSED protocol was bounded by O(m) encryptions. In
addition, the computation complexity of the SMINn protocol was bounded by O
(
(l ∗ n ∗
log2 n)
)
encryptions. Since the SBOR protocol utilized the SM protocol as a sub-routine,
the computation cost of the SBOR protocol was bounded by (small) constant number
of encryptions. Based on the previous analysis, the total computation complexity of the
SkNNm protocol was bounded by O
(
n ∗ (l + m + k ∗ l ∗ log2 n)
)
encryptions. More details
regarding the complexity analysis of sub-protocols are given in Section 3.5.
Depending on the encryption key size, the overall computation cost of the proposed
SkNNm protocol (more expensive than SkNNb) is between 2 and 3 orders of magnitude higher
than the non-crypto cases. This is the cost we need to pay to maximize data confidentiality.
However, on the user or client side, the running time is comparable to the non-crypto case
since the user only performs a very small number of encryption operations (bounded by
the number of attributes) which was done in less than a second as will be shown in the
experiments. The goal here is to outsource all or most computations to the cloud so that
the user can issue queries using any mobile device with limited storage and computing
capability. Note that data confidentiality is fully protected under the SkNNm protocol.
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4.6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The proposed protocols were implemented using Paillier cryptosystem [75] in C lan-
guage on top of the GNU multiple precision arithmetic library (http://gmblib.org/ ). Their
performance was also measured across a range of inputs.
Synthetic datasets were randomly generated according to the parameter values being
considered because it is difficult to control the parameters in a real dataset. The advantage
of using these synthetic datasets is that a more elaborated analysis could be performed
on the computation costs of the proposed protocols under different parameter settings.
These datasets were encrypted attribute-wise by the Paillier cryptosystem [75] with varied
key sizes. The encrypted data were stored on a local machine. A Linux machine with
an Intel R© Xeon R© Six-CoreTM CPU 3.07 GHz processor and 12GB RAM running Ubuntu
10.04 LTS was used to conduct all the experiments performed. The proposed protocols were
performed according to these dataset. Then, a random query was chosen and executed over
the encrypted data based on the proposed protocol.
For the rest of this section, the performance of Alice was not discussed as she was a
one-time cost, and she did not participate in computations. Instead, the evaluations were
based on the performance of both SkNNb and SkNNm protocols separately. Additionally,
the computation costs of the two proposed protocols were compared. In the experiments,
the Paillier encryption key size K was either 512 or 1024 bits.
4.6.1. Performance of the Basic Secure k-Nearest Neighbor Protocol. The
computation costs of the SkNNb protocol were evaluated by varying the number of data
records (n), number of attributes (m), number of nearest neighbors (k), and encryption key
size (K). Note that the SkNNb protocol is independent of the domain size of attributes (l).
The computation costs of the SkNNb protocol were evaluated first by fixing k = 5
and K = 512 and varying values of n and m. The computation cost grew linearly with n
and m (see Figure 4.1(a)). For example, when m = 6, the computation time of the SkNNb
protocol increased from 44.08 to 87.91 seconds when n changed from 2000 to 4000. A similar
trend could be observed for K = 1024 (see Figure 4.1(b)). For any fixed parameters, the
computation time of the SkNNb increased by almost a factor of 7 whenever K doubled.
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The computation costs of the SkNNb protocol were analyzed next by fixing m = 6
and n = 2000 and varying values of k and K (see Figure 4.1(c)). Irrespective of K, the
computation time of the SkNNb protocol did not change much with varying k. This is
because the computation time for the SkNNb protocol was dominated by the SSED protocol
which was independent of k. For example, when K = 512 bits, the computation time of the
SkNNb protocol changed from 44.08 to 44.14 seconds when k changed from 5 to 25. The
computation costs of the SkNNb protocol mainly depended on (or grew linearly with) n and
m. This finding is consistent with the upper bound derived in Section 4.5.
4.6.2. Performance of the Maximally Secure k-Nearest Neighbor Protocol.
The computation costs of the SkNNm protocol were analyzed by varying values of k, l, and
K. Throughout this evaluation, the values ofm and n were fixed to 6 and 2000, respectively.
However, the running time of the SkNNm protocol grew almost linearly with n and m. For
K = 512 bits, the computation costs of the SkNNm protocol for varying k and l are given
in Figure 4.1(d). For l = 6, the running time of the SkNNm protocol varied from 11.93 to
55.65 minutes when k was changed from 5 to 25, respectively. Also, for l = 12, the running
time of the SkNNm protocol varied from 20.68 to 97.8 minutes when k varied from 5 to
25, respectively. In either case, the cost of the SkNNm protocol grew almost linearly with
k and l. A similar trend can be observed for K = 1024 (see Figure 4.1(e)). In particular,
for any given fixed parameters, the computation cost of the SkNNm protocol increased by
almost a factor of 7 when K is doubled. For example, when k = 10, the SkNNm protocol
took 22.85 and 157.17 minutes to generate the 10 nearest neighbors of q under K = 512 and
K=1024 bits, respectively. Furthermore, when k = 5, around 69.7% of the cost in SkNNm
is accounted due to the SMINn protocol which is initiated k times in SkNNm (once in each
iteration). Also, the cost incurred due to the SMINn protocol increased from 69.7% to, at
least, 75% when k was increased from 5 to 25.
Additionally, the running times of both protocols were compared by fixing n = 2000,
m = 6, l = 6, and K = 512 and varying values of k. The running time of the SkNNb
protocol remained to be constant at 0.73 minutes because it was almost independent of k.
The running time of the SkNNm protocol , however, changed from 11.93 to 55.65 minutes
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Figure 4.1: Time complexities of both SkNNb and SkNNb for varying values of n, m, l, k,
and encryption key size K
Putting the above results together, it was concluded that the computation costs of
the the SkNNm were significantly higher than that of the SkNNb protocol. However, the
SkNNm protocol is more secure than the SkNNb protocol; therefore, the two protocols acts as
a trade-off between security and efficiency. Note that Bob’s computation cost is mainly due
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to the encryption of his input query record. As an example, for m = 6, Bob’s computation
costs are 4 and 17 milliseconds when K is 512 and 1024 bits, respectively. In the proposed
protocols, it is worth pointing out that users do not involve in any computations. Therefore,
the proposed protocols are very efficient from the end-user’s perspective.
4.6.3. Performance Improvement. At first, it seems that the proposed protocols
are costly and may not scale well for large datasets. However, in both protocols, the compu-
tations involved in each data record are independent of others. Therefore, the operations on
data records can be parallelized for efficiency purpose. To empirically evaluate this claim, a
parallel version of the SkNNb protocol was implemented using OpenMP programming [24]
and compared its computation costs with its serial version. Recall that the machine used in
experiments had 6 cores which could be used to perform parallel operations on 6 threads.
For m = 6, k = 5, and K = 512 bits, the comparison results are given in Figure 4.2.
The parallel version of the SkNNb protocol was roughly 6 times more efficient than
its serial version because of the fact that the parallel version could execute operations on
6 data records at a time (i.e., on 6 threads in parallel). For example, the running times of
parallel and serial versions of the SkNNb protocol for n = 10000 were 40 and 215.59 seconds,
respectively. Similar efficiency gains could be achieved by parallelizing the operations in the
SkNNm protocol.
Based on the above discussions, it was concluded that the scalability issue of the
proposed protocols can be eliminated or mitigated especially in a cloud computing environ-
ment, where high-performance parallel processing can easily be achieved. Additionally, using
the existing map-reduce techniques, one can drastically improve the performance further by
executing parallel operations on multiple nodes. Following from the previous empirical anal-
ysis, it is clear that SMINn protocol is the most costly sub-routine utilized in the SkNNm
protocol. Therefore, by improving the efficiency of the SMINn protocol, that can improve
the overall computation cost of the SkNNm protocol.
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Figure 4.2: Parallel vs. serial versions of the SkNNb protocol form = 6, k = 5, and K = 512
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5. ADVANCED ANALYTICAL QUERY
Data Mining has wide applications in many areas including banking, medicine, sci-
entific research, and government agencies. Classification is a very important task in various
data mining applications. Performing data mining tasks by a cloud has recently attracted
significant attentions. In general, performing any data mining tasks becomes challenging
without ever decrypting the data irrespective of the underlying encryption scheme [76, 84].
Existing privacy-preserving classification techniques are not applicable because the data
on the cloud is in encrypted form. Additional privacy concerns are demonstrated by the
following example.
Example 9. Suppose an insurance company outsourced its encrypted customers’ database
and relevant data mining tasks to a cloud. When an agent from the company wants to
determine the risk level of a potential new customer, he/she can use a classification method
to determine the customer’s risk level. First, the agent needs to generate a data record (q)
for the customer. This record contains certain personal information of the customer, e.g.,
credit score, age, marital status, etc. This record can then be sent to the cloud, and the
cloud will compute the class label for q. Nevertheless, to protect the customer’s privacy, q
should be encrypted before it is sent to the cloud because it contains sensitive information.

The above example illustrates that Data Mining over Encrypted Data (denoted by
DMED) on a cloud also needs to protect a user’s record when the record is part of a data
mining process. A cloud can also derive useful, sensitive information about the actual
data items by observing the data access patterns, even if the data are encrypted [27, 97].
Therefore, the privacy/security requirements of the DMED problem on a cloud are threefold:
(1) confidentiality of the encrypted data, (2) confidentiality of a user’s query record, and
(3) hiding data access patterns.
Existing work on Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) (either perturbation or
a SMC-based approach) cannot solve the DMED problem. Perturbed data do not possess
semantic security, so data perturbation techniques cannot be used to encrypt highly sensitive
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data. Additionally, perturbed data do not produce accurate data mining results. The SMC-
based approach assumes that data are distributed and not encrypted at each participating
party. Additionally, many intermediate computations are performed based on non-encrypted
data.
Fully homomorphic cryptosystems (e.g., [36]) can solve the DMED problem because
they allow a third-party (that hosts the encrypted data) to execute arbitrary functions
over encrypted data without ever decrypting them. Such techniques, however, are very
expensive, and their usage in practical applications has yet to be explored. For example, it
was shown in [37] that even for weak security parameters one “bootstrapping” operation of
the homomorphic operation would take at least 30 seconds on a high- performance machine.
As a result, in this chapter, a method to effectively solve the DMED problem on encrypted
relational data outsourced to a cloud is proposed.
This chapter specifically was focused on the classification problem over encrypted
data because the classification is one of the most common data mining tasks. Each clas-
sification technique has its own advantage. In particular, this work was concentrated on
executing the k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN) classification method over encrypted cloud data.
More specifically, a Secure k-Nearest Neighbor (SkNN) classifier over encrypted relational
data in the cloud was proposed [85]. Briefly, given a user’s encrypted query record q, the
goal is for a cloud to securely returns the encrypted class label for q based on the kNN
classification method. This protocol protects not only confidentiality of the original data
but also the user query from the cloud. It also hides the data access patterns and the clas-
sification result. This work was the first to develop a SkNN classifier over encrypted data
under the semi-honest model [85]. For ease of presentation, some common notations that
are used extensively throughout this chapter were summarized in Table 5.1.
5.1. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
Suppose Alice owns a database T of n records t1, . . . , tn and m+1 attributes. Let ti,j
denote the jth attribute value of record ti. Initially, Alice encrypts her database attribute-
wise. That is, she computes Epk(ti,j) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m + 1, where the
column (m + 1) contains the class labels. Assume that the underlying encryption scheme
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Table 5.1: Common notations used in the PPkNN protocol
Alice The data owner holding database T
Bob An authorized user who can access T ′ in the cloud
C1 or C2 Two non-colluding semi-honest cloud service providers
〈Epk, Dsk〉 A pair of Paillier’s encryption and decryption functions with (pk, sk)as public-secret key pair
Epk(x) Component-wise encryption of x: Epk(x1), . . . , Epk(xm)
T A relational database with n records: t1, . . . , tn
T ′ An encryption of T : Epk(t1), . . . , Epk(tn)
q Bob’s input query (m-dimensional vector): 〈q1, . . . , qm〉
w Number of unique class labels in T
l Domain size (in bits)
〈z1, zl〉 The least and most significant bits of integer z
[z] Vector of encryptions of the individual bits of z
cq The class label corresponding to q based on T
is semantically secure [75]. Let the encrypted database be denoted by T ′. Assume Alice
outsources both T ′ and the future classification process to a cloud.
Let Bob be an authorized user who wants to classify his input record q = 〈q1, . . . , qm〉
by applying the kNN classification method based on T ′. Such a process is referred to as
a Privacy-Preserving k-Nearest Neighbor (PPkNN) classification over encrypted relational
data in the cloud. Formally, the PPkNN protocol is defined as:
PPkNN(T ′, q)→ cq
where cq denotes the class label for q after the kNN classification method is applied to both
T ′ and q.
5.2. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS
A novel PPkNN protocol, a secure kNN classifier over semantically secure encrypted
data, is proposed [85]. Within this protocol, Alice does not participate in any computations
once the encrypted data are outsourced to the cloud. Therefore, no information is revealed
to Alice. This protocol also meets all the desired requirements discussed in Section 1.2:
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• Neither the contents of T nor any intermediate results should be revealed to the cloud.
• Bob’s input query q should not be revealed to the cloud.
• The output cq should be computed accurately and revealed only to Bob; no other
information should be revealed to Bob.
• Incur low computation overhead on the Bob after the encrypted query record is sent
to the cloud.
• Data access patterns, such as the records corresponds to the k-Nearest Neighbors of
q, should not be revealed to either Bob or the cloud (thereby preventing any inference
attacks).
The intermediate results that the cloud can see as part of this protocol are either newly
generated, randomized encryptions or random numbers. Thus, the cloud does not know
which data records correspond to the k-Nearest Neighbors and the output class label. Bob
does not involve in any computations after he sends his encrypted query record to the cloud.
Hence, the data access patterns are further protected from Bob.
5.3. THE PROPOSED PRIVACY-PRESERVING k-NEAREST NEIGHBOR
CLASSIFICATION PROTOCOL
A novel PPkNN classification protocol is proposed[85]. This protocol was constructed
based on the set of sub-components presented in Section 3.5 as building blocks [21, 29, 85]. In
the PPkNN protocol, the existence of two non-colluding semi-honest cloud service providers,
denoted by C1 and C2, which together form a federated cloud was assumed.
Recall that Alice’s database consists of n records, denoted by T = {t1, . . . , tn}, and
m + 1 attributes, where ti,j denotes the jth attribute value of record ti and the column
(m+ 1) contains the class labels. Initially, Alice encrypts her database attribute-wise using
her public key (pk). Let the encrypted database be denoted by T ′. Without loss of generality,
assume also that all attribute values and their Euclidean distances lie in [0, 2l). Additionally,
let w denote the number of unique class labels in T .
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Under this setting, Alice outsources her encrypted database (T ′) to C1, and the secret
key (sk) to C2. In this work, after outsourcing encrypted data to the cloud, Alice does not
participate in any future computations.
The goal of the PPkNN protocol is to classify users’ query records using T ′ in a
privacy-preserving manner. Consider Bob who wants to classify his query record q =
〈q1, . . . , qm〉 based on T ′ in C1. The proposed PPkNN protocol mainly consists of the
following two stages [85]:
• Stage 1 - Secure Retrieval of k-Nearest Neighbors (SRkNN):
In this stage, Bob initially sends his query q (in encrypted form) to C1. Both C1 and
C2 then involve in a set of sub-protocols to securely retrieve (in encrypted form) the
class labels corresponding to the k-Nearest Neighbors of the input query q. At the
end of this step, encrypted class labels of the k-Nearest Neighbors are known only to
C1.
• Stage 2 - Secure Computation of Majority Class (SCMCk):
Following from Stage 1, both C1 and C2 jointly compute the class label with a majority
voting among the k-Nearest Neighbors of q. At the end of this step, only Bob knows
the class label that corresponds to his input query record q.
The main steps involved in the proposed PPkNN protocol are presented in Algorithm 10.
Next, each of the two stages in the PPkNN protocol is explained in detail.
5.3.1. Stage 1: Secure Retrieval of k-Nearest Neighbors. During Stage 1
(SRkNN), Bob initially encrypts his query q attribute-wise. That is, he computes Epk(q) =〈
Epk(q1), . . . , Epk(qm)
〉
. He then sends Epk(q) to C1. The main steps involved in Stage 1





, and C2 with the secret key sk jointly involve in the Secure Squared
Euclidean Distance (SSED) protocol. Here, Epk(ti) =
〈
Epk(ti,1), . . . , Epk(ti,m)
〉
for 1 ≤ i ≤
n. The output of this step, denoted by Epk(di), is the encryption of squared Euclidean
distance between q and ti
(
i.e., di = |q − ti|2
)
. Recall that Epk(di) is known only to C1
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Note that the computation of exact Euclidean distance between encrypted
vectors is hard to achieve as it involves square root. In this study, however, it is sufficient
71
to compare the squared Euclidean distances as it preserves relative ordering. Both C1
with input Epk(di), and C2 then securely compute the encryptions of the individual bits
of di using the Secure Bit-Decomposition (SBD) protocol. Note that, the output [di] =〈
Epk(di,1), . . . , Epk(di,l)
〉
is known only to C1, where di,1 and di,l are the most and least
significant bits of di, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, respectively.
Both C1 and C2 then compute the encryptions of class labels that correspond to the
k-nearest neighbors of q in an iterative manner. More specifically, they compute Epk(c′1)
in the first iteration, Epk(c′2) in the second iteration, and so on. Here, c′s denotes the class
label of sth nearest neighbor to q for 1 ≤ s ≤ k. At the end of k iterations, only C1 knows〈
Epk(c
′




. To start with, consider the first iteration. Both C1 and C2 jointly
compute the encryptions of the individual bits of the minimum value among d1, . . . , dn and
encryptions of both the location and class label corresponding to dmin using the Secure
Minimum Out of n Numbers (SMINn) protocol. That is, both C1, with input (θ1, . . . , θn),










1 ≤ i ≤ n. Here, dmin denotes the minimum value among d1, . . . , dn; Iti and ti,m+1 denote





is the secret information associated with ti. For simplicity, this
work assumes that Iti = i. In the output, I and c′ denote the index and the class label




is known only to C1. Now, C1
performs the following operations locally:
• Assign Epk(c′) to Epk(c′1). Remember that, according to the SMINn protocol, c′ is
equivalent to the class label of the data record that corresponds to dmin. Thus, it is
same as the class label of the most nearest neighbor to q.
• Compute the encryption of difference between I and i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. That is, C1
computes τi = Epk(i) ∗ Epk(I)N−1 = Epk(i− I) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.




, where ri is a random number in ZN .
Note that τ ′i is an encryption of either 0 or a random number for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Also, it is
worth noting that exactly one of the entries in τ ′ is an encryption of 0 (which happens
iff i = I) and the remaining entries are encryptions of random numbers. Permute τ ′
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Algorithm 10 PPkNN(T ′, q)→ cq
Require: C1 has T ′ and pi; C2 has sk; Bob has q
1: Bob:
(a). Compute Epk(qj), for 1 ≤ j ≤ m
(b). Send Epk(q) =
〈
Epk(q1), . . . , Epk(qm)
〉
to C1
2: C1 and C2:
(a). C1 receives Epk(q) from Bob









3: for s = 1 to k do:













– for i = 1 to n do:
∗ τi ← Epk(i) ∗∆
∗ τ ′i ← τ rii , where ri ∈R ZN
– β ← pi(τ ′); send β to C2
(c). C2:
– Receive β from C1
– β′i ← Dsk(βi), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
– Compute U ′, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n: if β′i = 0 then U ′i = Epk(1) else U ′i = Epk(0)
– Send U ′ to C1
(d). C1:
– Receive U ′ from C2 and compute V ← pi−1(U ′)













using a random permutation function pi (known only to C1) to obtain β = pi(τ ′) and
send it to C2.
Upon receiving β, C2 decrypts it component-wise to obtain β′i = Dsk(βi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
After this, C2 computes an encrypted vector U ′ of length n. If β′i = 0, then Ui = Epk(1);
otherwise Ui = Epk(0). Because exactly one of the entries in τ ′ is an encryption of 0, this
further implies that exactly one of the entries in U ′ is an encryption of 1 and the remaining
entries are encryptions of 0’s. It is important to note that if β′k = 0, then pi−1(k) is the index
of the data record that corresponds to dmin. C2 then sends U ′ to C1. After receiving U ′, C1
performs inverse permutation on it to obtain V = pi−1(U ′). Note that exactly one of the
entry in V is Epk(1) and the remaining are encryptions of 0’s. Additionally, if Vi = Epk(1),
then ti is the most nearest tuple to q. Both C1 and C2, however, do not know which entry
in V is corresponding to Epk(1).
Finally, C1 updates the distance vectors [di] as follows:
• It is important to note that, the first nearest tuple to q should be obliviously excluded
from further computations. Since C1, however, does not know the record correspond-
ing to Epk(c′1), one need to obliviously eliminate the possibility of choosing this record
again in next iterations. For this, C1 obliviously updates the distance corresponding to
Epk(c
′
1) to the maximum value (i.e., 2l−1). More specifically, C1 updates the distance
vectors with the help of C2 using the Secure Bit-OR (SBOR) protocol for 1 ≤ i ≤ n





Observe that, when Vi = Epk(1), the corresponding distance vector di is set to the
maximum value. That is, under this case, [di] =
〈
Epk(1), . . . , Epk(1)
〉
. In contrast,
when Vi = Epk(0), the OR operation has no effect on the corresponding encrypted
distance vector.
The above process is repeated for k iterations. In each iteration, [di] corresponding to the
current chosen label is set to the maximum value. Both C1 and C2, however, do not know










, the list of the encrypted class labels of the k-Nearest Neighbors
to q.
5.3.2. Stage 2: Secure Computation of Majority Class. Without loss of
generality, suppose Alice’s dataset T consists of w unique class labels
(
denoted by c =
〈c1, . . . , cw〉
)
. Assume that Alice outsources her list of encrypted classes to C1. That is,
Alice outsources
〈
Epk(c1), . . . , Epk(cw)
〉
to C1 along with her encrypted database T ′ during
the data outsourcing step. Note that, for security reasons, Alice may add dummy cate-
gories into the list to protect the number of class labels (i.e., w) from both C1 and C2. For
simplicity, this work, however, assumes that Alice does not add any dummy categories to c.
During Stage 2 (SCMCk), C1 with private inputs Λ =
〈











, and C2 with sk securely compute Epk(cq). Here, cq denotes the
majority class label among c′1, . . . , c′k. At the end of the stage 2, only Bob knows the class
label cq.
The overall steps involved in Stage 2 are presented in Algorithm 11. To start with,
both C1 and C2 jointly compute the encrypted frequencies of each class label using the




using (Λ,Λ′) as C1’s input to




















for 1 ≤ i ≤ w. Here, [f(ci)] denotes the vector of encryptions of
the individual bits of f(ci) for 1 ≤ i ≤ w. Both C1 and C2, then jointly involve in the Secure
Maximum Out of w Numbers (SMAXw) protocol. It’s worth mentioning that by using the
similar formulations used to design SMIN and SMINn protocols, as discussed in Sections
3.5.7 and 3.5.8, one can also design SMAX and SMAXw protocols. Briefly, SMAXw utilizes









f(c1), . . . , f(cw)
)]





is known only to C1. C1 locally computes γq = Epk(cq + rq),
where rq is a random number in ZN that known only to C1. C1 then sends γq to C2 and
rq to Bob. Upon receiving γq, C2 decrypts it to obtain the randomized majority class label
γ′q = Dsk(γq) and sends it to Bob. Finally, upon receiving both rq from C1 and γ′q from C2,






















are known only to C1; sk is known
only to C2




























) ← SMAXw(ψ1, . . . , ψw), where ψi = ([f(ci)], Epk(ci)), for 1 ≤
i ≤ w
2: C1:
(a). γq ← Epk(cq) ∗ Epk(rq), where rq ∈R ZN
(b). Send γq to C2 and rq to Bob
3: C2:
(a). Receive γq from C1
(b). γ′q ← Dsk(γq); send γ′q to Bob
4: Bob:
(a). Receive rq from C1 and γ′q from C2
(b). cq ← γ′q − rq mod N
5.4. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A formal security proof for the PPkNN protocol under the semi-honest model was
provided [85]. First, Bob’s input query (q) is protected from Alice, C1 and C2 due to the
encryption of q and by semantic security of the Paillier cryptosystem [75]. Apart from
guaranteeing query privacy, remember that, the goal of the PPkNN protocol is to protect
data confidentiality and hide data access patterns.
In this study, to prove a protocol’s security under the semi-honest model, the well-
known security definitions from the literature of the Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC)
was adopted. More specifically, the security proofs based on the standard simulation
paradigm [41] was adopted (As discussed in Section 3.2). For presentation purpose, formal
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security proofs (under the semi-honest model) for Stages 1 and 2 of the PPkNN protocol
separately were provided. Note that, the outputs returned by each sub-protocol were in
encrypted form and would be known only to C1.
5.4.1. Security Proof for Stage 1. Recall that, the computations involved in
Stage 1 of the PPkNN were given as steps 1 to 3 in Algorithm 10. For ease of presentation,
this work considered the messages exchanged between both C1 and C2 in a single iteration
(however, similar analysis could be deduced for other iterations).
According to Algorithm 10, the execution image of C2 is given by
ΠC2(PPkNN) =
{〈βi, β′i〉 | for 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
where βi is an encrypted value which is a random in ZN2 . Also, β′i is derived upon decrypting
βi by C2. Remember that, exactly one entries in the β′ is 0 and the remaining entries are
random numbers in ZN . Without loss of generality, let the simulated image of C2 be denoted
by ΠSC2(PPkNN), where
ΠSC2(PPkNN) =
{〈a′1,i, a′2,i〉 | for 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
where a′1,i is randomly generated from ZN2 and the vector a′2 is randomly generated in such
a way that exactly one of the entries is 0 and the remaining entries are random numbers
in ZN . Since Epk is a semantically secure encryption scheme with a resulting ciphertext
size that is less than ZN2 , βi is computationally indistinguishable from a′1,i. Additionally,
since the random permutation function pi is known only to C1, β′ is a random vector of
exactly one 0 and random numbers in ZN . Thus, β′ is computationally indistinguishable
from a′2. As a result, the ΠC2(PPkNN) protocol is computationally indistinguishable from
ΠSC2(PPkNN). This implied that, C2 did not learn anything during the execution of Stage
1 in PPkNN.
Similarly, suppose the execution image of C1 is denoted by ΠC1(PPkNN), and is
given by
ΠC1(PPkNN) = {U ′}
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where U ′ is an encrypted value sent by C2 (at Step 3(c) of Algorithm 10). Let the simulated
image of C1 in Stage 1 be denoted by ΠSC1(PPkNN), which is given as
ΠSC1(PPkNN) = {a′}
where a′ is randomly generated from ZN2 . Since Epk is a semantically secure encryption
scheme with resulting ciphertexts in ZN2 , U ′ is computationally indistinguishable from a′.
This implied that ΠC1(PPkNN) is computationally indistinguishable from ΠSC1(PPkNN).
Hence, C1 could not learn anything during the execution of Stage 1 in PPkNN. Putting
the above results together, it was concluded that Stage 1 of PPkNN was secure under the
semi-honest model.
In each iteration, it is worth pointing out that both C1 and C2 did not know which
data record belongs to the current global minimum. Thus, the data access patterns were
protected from both C1 and C2. Informally speaking, at Step 3(c) of Algorithm 10, a
component-wise decryption of β did reveal the tuple that satisfy the current global minimum
distance to C2. Due to the random permutation by C1, however, C2 could not trace back
to the corresponding data record. Also, note that, decryption operations on vector β by
C2 would result in exactly one 0 and the remaining results were random numbers in ZN .
Similarly, since U ′ was an encrypted vector, C1 could not know which tuple corresponds to
current global minimum distance.
5.4.2. Security Proof for Stage 2. Stage 2 of the PPkNN protocol was secure
under the semi-honest model. Briefly, since the sub-protocols SF, SBD, and SMAXw are
secure, no information was revealed to C2. In contrast, the operations performed by C1
were entirely on encrypted data. No information, therefore, was revealed to C1.
Furthermore, the output data of Stage 1 which were passed as input to Stage 2
are in encrypted format. Therefore, the sequential composition of the two stages lead to
our PPkNN protocol and one could claim it to be secure under the semi-honest model
according to the Composition Theorem [41] given in Definition 2. In particular, based on
the above discussions, it was clear that the proposed PPkNN protocol protected the data
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confidentiality, user’s input query, and also hide data access patterns from Alice, C1, and
C2. Note that, Alice did not participate in any computations of the PPkNN protocol.
5.5. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
The proposed PPkNN protocol’s computation was analyzed. The computation com-
plexity for each sub-protocol was analyzed first under the assumptions that encryption and
decryption operations based on Paillier cryptosystem [75] take a similar amount of time, an
exponentiation operation was treated as an encryption operation, and an encryption oper-
ation is generally several orders of magnitude more expensive than a multiplication. The
computation complexity of Stage 1 in PPkNN was bounded by O(n) instantiations of the
SBD and the SSED protocols, O(k) instantiations of SMINn protocol, and O(n ∗ k ∗ l)
instantiations of the SBOR protocol. The computation complexity of the SBD protocol
proposed in [86] was bounded by O(l) encryptions. Also, the computation complexity of
the SSED protocol was bounded by O(m) encryptions. Additionally, the computation
complexity of the SMINn protocol was bounded by O(l ∗ n ∗ log2 n) encryptions. Since
the SBOR protocol utilized the SM protocol as a sub-routine, the computation cost of
the SBOR protocol was bounded by (small) constant number of encryptions and exponen-
tiations. Based on the above analysis, the total computation complexity of Stage 1 was
bounded by O
(
n ∗ (l +m+ k ∗ l ∗ log2 n)
)
encryptions.
In contrast, the computation complexity of Stage 2 was bounded by O(w) instanti-
ations of the SBD protocol, and one instantiation of both the SF and the SMAXw. Here,
the computation complexity of the SF protocol was bounded by O(k ∗ w) encryptions and
O(k ∗ w) exponentiations. More details regarding the complexity analysis of sub-protocols
were given in Section 3.5. Therefore, the total computation complexity of Stage 2 was
bounded by O
(
w ∗ (l + k + l ∗ log2w)
)
encryptions.
In general, w  n, therefore, the computation cost of Stage 1 should be significantly
higher than that of Stage 2. This observation was further justified by the empirical results
given in the next section.
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5.6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The proposed PPkNN protocol was implemented and its performance was measured
across a range of inputs [85]. By using the Paillier cryptosystem[75] as the underlying
additive homomorphic encryption scheme, the protocol was implemented in C. Various
experiments were conducted on a Linux machine with an Intel R© Xeon R© Six-CoreTM CPU
3.07 GHz processor and 12GB RAM running Ubuntu 12.04 LTS.
This work is the first effort to develop a secure k-Nearest Neighbor classifier under the
semi-honest model. Thus, there was no existing work to compare with this work. Therefore,
the performance of the PPkNN protocol is evaluated under different parameter settings.
For the experiments, the Car Evaluation dataset from the UCI KDD archive [12] had
used. The dataset consisted of 1728 data records (i.e., n = 1728) with 6 input attributes (i.e.,
m = 6). Also, there is a separate class attribute. The dataset categorized into four different
classes (i.e., w = 4) and encrypted attribute-wise, using the Paillier [75] encryption whose
key size is varied in the experiments. The encrypted data stored on the above machine.
Then, a random query was chosen and executed over the encrypted data based on the
PPkNN protocol. For the rest of this section, the performance of Alice was not discussed
as she was a one-time cost. Instead, the evaluation were based on the performances of the
two stages in the PPkNN protocol separately.
The computation costs of Stage 1 in the PPkNN protocol were analyzed first by
varying values of number of k-nearest neighbors (see Figure 5.1(a)). The Paillier encryption
key size K was either 512 or 1024 bits. The computation cost of Stage 1 for K=512 bits
varied from 9.98 to 46.16 minutes when k varied from 5 to 25, respectively. In contrast,
the computation cost of Stage 1 for K=1024 bits varied from 66.97 to 309.98 minutes when
k varied from 5 to 25, respectively. In either case, the computation time of Stage 1 grew
almost linearly with k. Additionally, for any given k, the cost of Stage 1 increased by almost
a factor of 7 whenever K doubled. For example, when k=10, Stage 1 required 19.06 and
127.72 minutes to generate the encrypted class labels of the 10 nearest neighbors under
K=512 and K=1024 bits, respectively. Furthermore, when k=5, one could observe that
around 66.29% of the cost in Stage 1 accounted due to SMINn which initiated k times
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in the PPkNN protocol (once in each iteration). Also, the cost incurred due to SMINn
increased from 66.29% to 71.66% when k varied from 5 to 25.
The computation costs of Stage 2 were analyzed next by varying values of k and K
(see Figure 5.1(b)). The computation time for Stage 2 varied from 0.118 to 0.285 seconds
when k varied from 5 to 25. In contrast, for K=1024 bits, Stage 2 took 0.789 and 1.89
seconds when k = 5 and k=25, respectively. The low computation costs of Stage 2 were
due to SMAXw which incurred significantly fewer computations than the SMINn in Stage
1. This further justified the theoretical analysis given in Section 5.5. Note that, in the
dataset, w=4 and n=1728. Like in Stage 1, for any given k, the computation time of Stage
2 increased by almost a factor of 7 whenever K doubled. For example, when k=10, the
computation time of Stage 2 varied from 0.175 to 1.158 seconds when the encryption key
size K changed from 512 to 1024 bits. A similar analysis could be observed for other values
of k and K (see Figure 5.1(b)).
Based on the above results, it was clear that the computation cost of Stage 1 was
significantly higher than that of Stage 2. More specifically, the computation time of Stage
1 accounted for at least 99% of the total time in the PPkNN protocol. For example, when
k = 10 and K=512 bits, the computation costs of Stage 1 and 2 are 19.06 minutes and
0.175 seconds, respectively. Under this scenario, the cost of Stage 1 was 99.98% of the total
cost of the PPkNN protocol. Putting the above together, it was concluded that the total
computation time of the PPkNN protocol grew almost linearly with both n and k.
5.6.1. Performance Improvement. Two different approaches are proposed to
boost the efficiency of Stage 1 (as the performance of the PPkNN protocol depended pri-
marily on Stage 1).
The first approach to improving the performance the performance of Stage 1 is by
pushing some computation offline. More specifically, some of the computations in Stage
1 could be pre-computed (pushed offline). For example, encryptions of random numbers,
0s and 1s could be pre-computed (by the corresponding parties) in the offline phase. As
a result, the online computation cost of Stage 1 (denoted by SRkNNo) is expected to be
improved. To see the actual efficiency gains of such a strategy, the costs of SRkNNo were
computed and compared with the costs of Stage 1 without an offline phase (simply denoted
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by SRkNN) and the results for K = 1024 bits are shown in Figure 5.1(c). Irrespective of
the values of k, one could observe that SRkNNo was around 33% faster than SRkNN. For
example, the computation costs of SRkNNo and SRkNN for k = 10 were 84.47 and 127.72
minutes, respectively (boosting the online running time of Stage 1 by 33.86%).
The second approach to improving the performance of Stage 1 is by using parallelism.
Since operations on data records are independent of one another, the most computations in
Stage 1 could be parallelized. To empirically evaluate this claim, a parallel version of Stage 1
(denoted by SRkNNp) was implemented using OpenMP programming [24] and compared its
cost with the costs of SRkNN (i.e., the serial version of Stage 1). The computation cost of
SRkNNp for K = 1024 varied from 12.02 to 55.5 minutes when k changed from 5 to 25 (see
Figure 5.1(c)). SRkNNp was almost 6 times more efficient than SRkNN. This was because
the machine used for this experiments had 6 cores. Thus, the computations could be run in
parallel on 6 separate threads. Based on the above discussions, it was clear that efficiency of
Stage 1 could indeed be improved significantly using parallelism. Moreover, one could also
use the existing map-reduce techniques to execute parallel operations on multiple nodes to
drastically improve the performance further. Hence, the level of achievable performance in
the PPkNN protocol actually depended on the implementation.
In contrast, Bob’s computation cost in the PPkNN protocol was mainly due to the
encryption of his input query. In the dataset, Bob’s computation cost was 4 and 17 millisec-
onds whenK was 512 and 1024 bits, respectively. It was apparent that PPkNN protocol was
very efficient from Bob’s computational perspective which was especially beneficial when he
issued queries from a resource-constrained device (such as mobile phone and PDA).
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(a) Total cost of Stage 1
(b) Total cost of Stage 2
(c) Efficiency gains of Stage 1 for K = 1024
Figure 5.1: Computation costs of the PPkNN protocol for varying number of kNNs and
different encryption key sizes in bits (K)
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6. CORRELATED RANGE QUERY
Recently, biometric authentication/identification has increasingly gained importance
for various application domains. Those systems which include fingerprint-, face- and iris-
authentication/identification systems are widely used in enterprise, civilian and law en-
forcement. Such systems typically consist of an entity whose databases hold biometric
records and users/clients who send the entity their biometric recordings for authentica-
tion/identification [32]. During the process of biometric authentication, the systems need
to identify whether candidate biometric readings from users match the records in the en-
tity’s biometric database. In contrast, during the process of biometric identification, the
systems need to retrieve the profile of a person whose biometric data record in the entity’s
biometric database matches the user’s input biometric data record.
There are potential privacy concerns regarding biometric authentication/ identifica-
tion: biometric matching process would cause a leakage of user’s biometric data especially
running on untrusted servers. Biometric data are usually very sensitive because they could
uniquely identify a person. Thus, the leakage of biometric data to malicious parties can
lead to a violation of personal privacy. To avoid this privacy concern, Privacy-Preserving
Biometric Authentication (PPBA) and Privacy-Preserving Biometric Identification (PPBI)
protocols have been developed (e.g., [10, 11, 30, 32, 83]). A PPBI protocol generally returns
the profile of a person whose biometric data record stored on the server matches the user’s
input biometric data record. Whereas a PPBA protocol only returns a single bit to indicate
if there is a match or not. Under the existing PPBA and PPBI protocols, a user’s biometric
data record is never disclosed to the entity, and the entity’s biometric database is never
exposed to the user [21].
Due to the cost efficiency and operational flexibility of the cloud computing paradigm
[4, 20, 60], an entity has the opportunity to outsource its data and their relevant computa-
tions to a cloud which can provide on-demand services. To outsource biometric authenti-
cation tasks, the entity’s biometric database needs to be encrypted before outsourced to a
cloud.
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Recall that the goal of PPBA/PPBI protocols are to perform biometric authen-
tication/identification without disclosing the involved biometric data to the participating
parties, except for their own data. When the biometric data are encrypted and cannot be
decrypted by a cloud, the existing PPBA/PPBI protocols are not applicable in the cloud
computing environment where the cloud stores encrypted biometric data for authenti-
cation/identification purposes. Therefore, in this chapter, Outsourceable and Privacy-
Preserving Biometric Authentication (PPBAO) [21] and Outsourceable and Privacy-
Preserving Biometric Identification (PPBIO)) protocols over biometric data stored in the
cloud were presented. For ease of presentation, some common notations that are used
extensively throughout this chapter are summarized in Table 6.1.
6.1. OUTSOURCEABLE AND PRIVACY-PRESERVING BIOMETRIC AU-
THENTICATION
This section focused on developing the PPBAO protocol. In this protocol, a user
issues an encrypted biometric data query record to a cloud. The cloud then securely returns
a single bit to indicate if the distance between any of the biometric data records stored in
a cloud and the user’s input query is below t. Here, t denotes a pre-defined threshold.
6.1.1. Defining the Problem. Let D = {v1, . . . , vn} denote an entity’s biometric
image database with n biometric data records. Each vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n is an m-dimensional
vector representation of a biometric data record. Let D′ =
{
Epk(v1), . . . , Epk(vn)
}
denote
the encryption of D, where each Epk(vi) is encrypted component-wise using an Additive
Homomorphic Public Key Encryption (AH-Enc) scheme. Let Bob be a user who wants
to be authenticated securely using his biometric image data denoted by u. Here, u is






A biometric data record (vi) exists in D such that the distance between u and vi is below
t when b = 1, otherwise b = 0. t is defined by the underlying biometric authentication
system. It varies from system to system. It also depends on the biometric data used for
authentication. How to determine the best value for t is out of the scope of this work, so one
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Table 6.1: Common notations used in the PPBAO/PPBIO protocols
C1 or C2 Two non-colluding semi-honest cloud service providers
Bob
A user who wants to securely perform biometric authentica-
tion/identification
vi or u m-dimension feature vector representation of a biometric data image
pi s-dimension vector representation of an identity profile data
Epk(x) Component-wise encryption of x: Epk(x1), . . . , Epk(xm)
D A biometric database with n records: v1, . . . , vn
D′ An encryption of D: Epk(v1), . . . , Epk(vn)
P An identity profile database with n records: p1, . . . , pn
P ′ An encryption of P : Epk(p1), . . . , Epk(pn)
u Bob’s biometric image data record: u1, . . . , um
t A Pre-defined threshold
can just assume t is publicly known parameter. Both D′ and Epk(u) are never decrypted to
maximize the confidentiality protection of both D and u during an execution of PPBAO.
This work inherits the common structure of the existing PPBA systems which mainly
consist of two phases: distance computation, and matching and retrieval [32]. In the distance
computation phase, either Euclidean or Hamming distance between the feature vectors of
biometric records vi’s in D and the user’s biometric data record u are calculated pairwise.
After that in matching and retrieval phase, those distances are compared with a pre-defined
threshold t to decide whether u matches some vi with t-distance apart. Some biometric
authentication protocols such as face recognition [30] need a feature extraction phase to get
the biometric feature vectors; however, this work assumed that the feature extraction phase
as a pre-computation stage to produce the feature vectors in both D and u.
6.1.2. Main Contributions. A secure PPBAO protocol is proposed [21]. Within
this protocol, the entity (data owner) does not participate in any computations once the
encrypted data are outsourced to the cloud. Therefore, no information is revealed to the
entity. This protocol also meets all the desired requirements discussed in Section 1.2:
• Neither the contents of D or any intermediate results should not be revealed to the
cloud.
• Bob’s biometric image data u should not be revealed to the cloud.
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• The output b should not be revealed to the cloud.
• Incur low computation overhead at the end-user side because Bob stops involving in
computations after he sends his encrypted biometric data.
• Data access patterns, such as the biometric data records corresponding to the matching
or comparison results with u, should not be revealed to either Bob or the cloud.
It is worth pointing out that the intermediate results that the cloud can see as part of this
protocol are either newly generated randomized encryptions or random numbers.
6.1.3. The Proposed Outsourceable and Privacy-Preserving Biometric Au-
thentication Protocol. Let C1 denote a cloud service provider who storesD′ and performs
biometric authentication based on D′, Epk(u), and t. In addition to C1, another independent
cloud service provider (C2) is utilized in the proposed PPBAO protocol. This protocol uses
anAH-Enc scheme to encrypt each vi and u component-wise to produce Epk(vi) and Epk(u).
There are several AH-Enc schemes, and, without loss of generality, this work adopts the
Paillier cryptosystem [75] because it is simple to implement and semantically secure. D′ is
outsourced and stored at C1, and only C2 has the corresponding decryption key sk. There-
fore, D′ and Epk(u) cannot be decrypted by C1 without accessing the decryption key. To
solve the proposed PPBAO problem, one might suggest using garbled circuits [53] for every
secure computation between C1 and C2. This is logical for simple tasks (e.g., secure com-
parison), where such an approach can be quite efficient. However, biometric authentication
is a complex process consisting of several sub-components.
The best way to implement an efficient two-party secure protocol for a functionality
as complex as biometric authentication is to combine a homomorphic encryption approach
and a garbled circuit approach. This hybrid approach was adopted in [72] to produce a
secure protocol that is more efficient than either the homomorphic encryption approach or
the garbled circuit approach alone. The key challenges in utilizing the hybrid approach are:
• Breaking a complex functionality into a set of simpler sub-components.
• Determining which approach to use to implement each sub-component securely.
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In the next section, this work dissects the PPBAO into sub-components and identifies the
most efficient approach, between homomorphic encryption or garbled circuit, to implement
each component [21].
6.1.3.1. Sub-Components of the PPBAO Protocol. To implement a PPBAO
protocol, each biometric image first needs to be represented as a feature vector. For the
rest of this work, assume the feature vector of each biometric image is given as part of the
input to a PPBAO protocol.
According to Equation 6.1 and based on the description given in Section 6.1.1, a
PPBAO protocol (with input D′ = {Epk(v1), . . . , Epk(vn)}, Epk(u) and t) consists of three
main sub-components or protocols that need to be performed sequentially. According to
the composition theorem [41], when a protocol is implemented based on a set of secure
primitives, and for the protocol to be secure, the intermediate results produced from these
primitives must be in the form of random shares. Both the description and the outcome of
each sub-component are given as follows [21]:
(1) Distance computation: This component computes the distance between u and each vi for
1 ≤ i ≤ n. Note that the distance is between the actual feature vectors, but the input
should be the encrypted feature vectors Epk(u) and Epk(vi). During the computation,
both Epk(u) and Epk(vi) are never decrypted to preserve the confidentiality of both u
and vi. Let di denote the distance between u and vi. The output of this component
returns two random shares d′i and d′′i for each di such that d′i + d′′i mod N = di.
(2) Comparing with the threshold : Once computed, these distances need to be compared
with the threshold t to find out if u is one of v1, . . . , vn. A distance less than t indicates
that u matches some biometric record in D. Again, all these computations are based on
encrypted data or random shares. More specifically, the (d′i, d′′i ) pairs and the threshold
t are the input for this sub-component. Let bi denote the comparison result between di
and t. If di < t, then bi = 1, otherwise bi = 0. The output of this component returns
two random shares b′i and b′′i for each bi such that b′i + b′′i mod N = bi.
(3) Combining the comparison results : As long as there is a bi equal to 1, one can conclude
that u matches some vi in D. Then the authentication succeeds. The (b′i, b′′i ) are the
input for this sub-component. Let bf denote the final authentication result. If bf = 1,
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then authentication succeeds. On the other hand, if bf = 0, then the authentication
fails. The output of this component returns two random shares b′f and b′′f such that
b′f + b
′′
f mod N = bf .
Note that it is possible for the last component to return bf directly, but both b′f and b′′f are
more useful in case bf serves as an intermediate result for a more complex protocol. Based
on their need, the participating parties can decide the appropriate output. Without loss of
generality, this work adopts b′f and b′′f as the final outcome of the proposed PPBAO protocol.
Depending on the specific functionality or computation, this work has identified the
most efficient and secure method (either a homomorphic encryption based approach or
garbled circuit) to implement each sub-component.
(1) Secure Distance Computation - Since biometric data have multiple types, and each
type can be represented in various ways, this work implemented secure sub-protocols
to compute the two most common distance metrics adopted in the existing PPBI work:
Euclidean distance and Hamming distance (as discussed in Section 3.5). Both metrics
have their advantages and disadvantages, and an entity can decide which metric to
use for its PPBAO protocol. Two sub-protocols for implementing secure Euclidean
and Hamming distances, namely Secure Squared Euclidean Distance-Random Share
(SSEDR) and Secure Hamming Distance-Random Share (SHDR), were implemented
based on the homomorphic encryption approach. They were more efficient than gar-
bled circuit-based solutions. A detailed analysis is provided in Sections 3.5.3 and
3.5.4. This chapter does not specify the distance metric (either Euclidean or Ham-
ming). Depending on the type of biometric data and the feature vector, the entity
who outsourced its biometric authentication to the cloud can decide the appropriate
metric to use. For simplicity, the term Secure_Distance(a, b) is used to refer to
the process of securely computing the distance between a and b.
(2) Securely Comparing with the Threshold - A secure comparison protocol is needed to
implement the second sub-component securely. The secure comparison protocol, de-
noted by Secure Comparison with a Threshold (SCT) (as discussed in Section 3.5.10),
takes random shares (i.e., d′i and d′′i ) and a threshold t as input and returns two random
shares b′i and b′′i . If di ≤ t, then b′i + b′′i mod N = 1; otherwise b′i + b′′i mod N = 0.
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It was assumed here that SCT(d′i, d′′i , t)→ (b′i, b′′i ) was the protocol used to implement
this sub-component. A garbled circuit was used to construct it, where d′i and d′′i are
private input values from C1 and C2, respectively, and t is a publicly known parameter.
The protocol returns b′i to C1 and b′′i to C2.
(3) Securely Combining the Comparison Results - The third sub-component/ functional-
ity was used to identify the existence of a comparison result that is equal to 1. The
individual comparison results cannot be disclosed to maximize the security guarantee;
otherwise, the first two sub-components would have been sufficient. The challenge now
is to determine whether or not there is a comparison result of 1 without disclosing
which encrypted biometric record Epk(vi) matches Epk(u). Disclosing the matching
result may be considered harmless because a server only knows if two encrypted bio-
metric data records match. The matching result, however, must not be leaked to
preserve the security guarantee of the underlying encryption scheme [54].
The protocol’s design was based on the following observations to prevent disclosing
either the matching or the comparison results to C1 and C2 [21]:
Observation 1. Let b1, . . . , bn be the n actual comparison results from comparing d1, . . . ,
dn with the threshold t, where d1, . . . , dn are the distances between u and each of
v1, . . . , vn. Then, bf = 1 if and only if 0 <
∑n
i=1 bi.








i . Then, α + β mod N =
∑n
i=1 bi.
These observations reveal that the same secure comparison protocol used to implement
the second sub-component can be used here to implement this sub-component. More
specifically, the protocol SCT(α, β, 0) → (b′f , b′′f ) was used to implement the sub-
component. A garbled circuit was used to conduct it, where α and β are private input
values from C1 and C2, respectively, and 0 is a public parameter. The protocol returns
b′f to C1 and b′′f to C2 such that b′f + b′′f mod N = bf .
6.1.3.2. The PPBAO Protocol: . A PPBAO protocol, directly based on these
components, can be built once the three sub-components have been properly and securely
implemented (as discussed in Section 3.5). The key steps in the PPBAO protocol are given






Require: C1 has D′ and Epk(u), C2 has the decryption key sk, and t is a public parameter




, for i = 1 to n











5: C1 and C2 jointly execute SCT(α, β, 0)
6: b← b′f + b′′f mod N
have been received by C1. The same public key that was used to encrypt D to produce D′
was used here, where D′ was encrypted by the entity that owns the biometric database D.
Step 1 of Algorithm 12 can be used to securely compute the distance between u
and each of v1, . . . , vn. Both C1 and C2 receive d′1, . . . , d′n and d′′1, . . . , d′′n as their private
outputs, respectively. Note that the distance metric (neither Euclidean nor Hamming) is
specified in the protocol. Depending on the type of biometric data and the feature vector,
the entity who outsourced its biometric authentication to a cloud can decide the appropriate
metric to use (either Euclidean nor Hamming). The SSEDR and SHDR in Algorithm 12
are interchangeable without affecting the PPBAO protocol’s security and correctness.
The output from Step 1 serves as the input for Step 2. At the end of Step 2, C1
receives b′1, . . . , b′n, and C2 receives b′′1, . . . , b′′n. Both C1 and C2 compute α and β (each one
an input for Step 5 of the algorithm) independently. Step 5 returns b′f to C1 and b′′f to C2.
C2 can send d′′f to C1, and bf can be reconstructed by adding the two random shares modulo
N to obtain the actual authentication result. Steps 2, 3, and 5 of Algorithm 12 correspond
to the three sub-components. Their implementations are investigated in Section 3.5.
6.1.4. Security Analysis. The PPBAO protocol was secure under the semi-honest
adversary model of Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC). The protocol was a sequential
composition of sub-protocols. Thus, the security of each sub-protocol needed to be proved
before the PPBAO’s security could be proved. As discussed in Sections 3.5.3 and 3.5.4,
both SSEDR and SHDR protocols were proven secure under the semi-honest model because
the computations were performed on either encrypted data or randomized data [21]. The
SCT protocol was implemented using a garbled circuit, which was also secure under the
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semi-honest model [53]. All these sub-protocols of PPBAO produced random shares as
intermediate results. Therefore, according to the sequential composition theorem [41] given
in Definition 2, the PPBAO protocol was also secure under the semi-honest model.
6.1.5. Complexity Analysis. The proposed PPBAO protocol’s computation com-
plexity was analyzed under the assumptions that encryption and decryption operations
based on the Paillier cryptosystem [75] take a similar amount of time, an exponentiation
operation was treated as an encryption operation, and an encryption operation is gener-
ally several orders of magnitude more expensive than a multiplication. Recall that the
computation complexity of the SSEDR and the SHDR protocols were bounded by O(m)
encryptions. Also, O(m) encryptions provided an appropriate upper bound for the SCT
protocol. Since the PPBAO protocol executed the Secure_Distance protocol n times
and the SCT protocol n+1 times, this work can claim that the total computation complex-
ity of PPBAO was bound by O(mn) encryptions. More details regarding the complexity
analysis of sub-protocols are given in Section 3.5.
6.1.6. Performance Evaluation. Recall that the proposed protocol is a sequen-
tial composition of three sub-protocols. Each sub-protocol was implemented, and its per-
formance was measured across a range of inputs [21].
Synthetic datasets were randomly generated according to the parameter values being
considered. The advantage of using these synthetic datasets is that a more elaborated
analysis could be performed on the computation costs of the proposed protocols under
different parameter settings. Biometrics feature vectors were randomly generated according
to the parameter values being considered (e.g., n- number of record vectors and m-vector
size). These feature vectors were encrypted component-wise by the Paillier cryptosystem [75]
with a 1024-bit modulus and stored on a local machine. The PPBAO protocol was performed
according to this dataset. A Linux machine with an Intel R© Xeon R© Six-CoreTM CPU 3.07
GHz was used to conduct all of the experiments.
The computation costs of the SSEDR sub-protocol (Step 1 of Algorithm 12) were
analyzed first by varying m and n. The computation costs of the SCT sub-protocols (Steps
3 and 5 of Algorithm 12) were analyzed next by varying n because m is irrelevant to the
secure comparison task.
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The SSEDR was implemented by the Paillier encryption [75] in C language on top of
the GNU multiple precision arithmetic library (https://gmplib.org/). The computation cost
grew linearly with n and m (see Figure 6.1(a)). For example, when m = 5, the computation
time of SSEDR increased from 1.987 to 9.921 minutes when n was varied from 1000 to 5000.
The SCT sub-protocol was built on top of a GCParser framework [65], which is a
modular intermediate level language for easily optimizing and executing garbled circuits.
The m did not affect this stage’s performance because the size of the inputs for this stage
were fixed by 1024 bits modulus, which are random shares of a 1024 bit number. The
computation costs of this SCT were evaluated by fixing m = 5 and varying values of n.
The SCT’s running time varied from 37.45 to 185.013 minutes when n changed from 1000
to 5000, respectively (see Figure 6.1(b)). Thus, the running time grew almost linearly with
n.
The computation costs of the PPBAO protocol scaled almost linearly with n and m
(see Figure 6.1(c)). For example, whenm = 5, the computation time of the PPBAO protocol
increased from 39.032 to 194.934 minutes when n varied from 1000 to 5000. Therefore, the
computation time for the PPBAO protocol was dominated by the time required to compare
the encrypted distance vectors. The run-time complexity of the SSEDR protocol was,
however, greater than the SCT protocol when m was sufficiently large (e.g., over 100). This
finding is consistent with the upper bound derived in Section 6.1.5.
The communication cost was roughly 16MB for n = 5000, m = 25, and an encryption
key size of 1024. The time needed to transmit 16MB of data was significantly less than the
computation time. Therefore, this communication complexity was ignored in the proposed
protocol.
6.1.6.1. Performance Improvement. The proposed PPBAO protocol is not prac-
tical if biometric authentication needs to be completed in real time, even though it is the
best two-party protocol that is known. One primary advantage of the proposed protocol is
that the computations of the sub-components can be parallelized. For example, at Steps
1 and 2 of Algorithm 12, the Secure_Distance computation and the SCT are indepen-
dent and can be performed at the same time. The PPBAO protocol can take advantage of
highly parallel computing capabilities because C1 and C2 are assumed to be cloud service
93
(a) Secure_DistanceeR
(b) Secure_Comparison for m = 5
(c) OPPBA execution time
Figure 6.1: Time complexities of a) SSEDR, b) SCT, and c) PPBAO by varying n and m
providers. If C1 and C2 have n nodes available to execute the PPBAO protocol, Step 1 can
be performed within a second, and Step 2 can be performed in slightly more than 2 seconds.
Thus, the total running time would be approximately 5 seconds. In general, SMC-based
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privacy-preserving protocols are very expensive. Utilizing the cloud is the only way to make
real-time applications (e.g., biometric authentication) practical.
6.2. OUTSOURCEABLE AND PRIVACY-PRESERVING BIOMETRIC IDEN-
TIFICATION
This section is focused on developing Outsourceable and Privacy-Preserving Biomet-
ric Identification (PPBIO) protocol. In this protocol, a user issues an encrypted biometric
data query record to a cloud. The cloud then securely returns all the identity profiles asso-
ciated with the biometric image data records whose distances from the user’s input query
are below t. Here, t denotes a pre-defined threshold.
6.2.1. Defining the Problem. Let D = {v1, . . . , vn} denote an entity’s biometric
database with n biometric data records. Each vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n is anm-dimensional vector repre-
sentation of a biometric image data record. Let D′ =
{
Epk(v1), . . . , Epk(vn)
}
denote the en-
cryption ofD, where each Epk(vi) is encrypted component-wise. Let P = {p1, . . . , pn} denote
an identity profile database of n records and s attributes (e.g., SSN, name, age, and criminal
record). Let pi,j denote the jth attribute value of record pi. Let P ′ =
{
Epk(p1), . . . , Epk(pn)
}
denote the encryption of P , where each Epk(pi) is encrypted component-wise. Here, vi de-
notes the biometric image data that corresponds to an identity profile pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Suppose Bob is a user who wants to learn all the identity profile records associated with the
biometric image data records whose distances from his input query u are below t. Here, u
is represented by the same method as the records in D.
Briefly, the goal of the PPBIO protocol is to securely retrieve the set of identity
profile records, denoted by S, such that the following property holds:
∀pi ∈ S, bi = 1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
where b1, . . . , bn is the n actual comparison result. If the distance between u and vi is less
than t then b = 1; otherwise, bi = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The t is defined by the underlying
biometric identification system. It varies from system to system. It also depends on the
biometric data used for identification. More formally, the PPBIO protocol can be defined
95
as follows, with D′, P ′, and Epk(u) used as inputs:
PPBIO
(
D′, P ′, Epk(u), t
)→ S (6.2)
The D′, P ′, and Epk(u) are never decrypted to maximize the confidentiality protection
of D, P , and u during an execution of the PPBIO protocol. This protocol also meets the
desired requirements discussed in Section 1.2:
6.2.2. The Proposed Outsourceable and Privacy-Preserving Biometric
Identification Protocol. The PPBIO protocol proposed here consists of three phases:
distance computation, matching, and retrieval. Each biometric image needs to be repre-
sented as a feature vector before a PPBIO protocol can be implemented. The feature vector
of each biometric image is assumed to be given as part of the input to a PPBIO protocol.
According to Equation 6.2 and the above description, a PPBIO protocol consists of two main
sub-components that need to be performed sequentially: distance computation and com-
paring with the threshold. A PPBIO protocol can be built based on the same components
used to implement the PPBAO protocol.
The primary steps involved in the proposed PPBIO protocol are given in Algorithm
13. Here, Bob’s encrypted biometric image data record Epk(u) =
{
Epk(u1), . . . , Epk(um)
}
is assumed to have been received by C1. It is encrypted with the same public key as
that used to encrypt D to produce D′, where D′ is encrypted by the entity that owns the
biometric image database D. Step 1(a) of Algorithm 13 securely computes the distance
between u and v1, . . . , vn. C1 and C2 receive d′1, . . . , d′n and d′′1, . . . , d′′n as their private
outputs, respectively. Note that, in this protocol, the distance metric (either Euclidean or
Hamming) is not specified. The entity that outsourced its biometric identification to C1
and C2 can decide which metric to use. The SSEDR and the SHDR protocols in Algorithm
13 are interchangeable without affecting the PPBIO protocol’s security and correctness.
The output from Step 1(a) serves as the input for Step 1(b). At the end of Step 1(b), C1





. Steps 1(a) and 1(b) of Algorithm 13 correspond to the two sub-components and their
implementations investigated in Section 3.5.
96
Algorithm 13 PPBIO(D′, P ′, Epk(u), t)→ S
Require: C1 has D′, P ′ and Epk(u), C2 has the decryption key, and t is a public parameter









i )← SCT(d′i, d′′i , t)
(c). C1 send b′i to Bob, C2 send b
′′
i to Bob
2: Bob: for 1 ≤ i ≤ n do:
(a). Receive b′i from C1 and b
′′
i from C2
(b). Compute bi ← (b′i, b′′i )
(c). if @ bi = 1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
• No Match
(d). else
• S ← φ
• Retrieve the ith record from C1 using Oblivious_Transfer(n1 ):
Epk(pi)← OTn1 (i)
• Epk(γi,h)← Epk(pi,h) ∗ Epk(ri,h), where ri,h ∈R ZN , for 1 ≤ h ≤ s
• Send Epk(γi,h) to C2, for 1 ≤ h ≤ s
• C2: for 1 ≤ h ≤ s
– Receive Epk(γi,h) from Bob




– Send γ′i,h to Bob
• Bob: :
– Receive γ′i,h from C2, for 1 ≤ h ≤ s
– pi,h ← γ′i,h − ri,h mod N , for 1 ≤ h ≤ s
– S ← S ∪ pi
In Step 2, upon receiving the comparison results b1, . . . , bn from comparing d1, . . . , dn
from C1 and C2, Bob proceeds as follows:
• Compute bi ← b′i + b′′i mod N , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and verify if there is a match or a “no
match”. In case there is a match, Bob initially sets the output set S to φ and continues
as follows:





corresponding comparison result (bi) is equal to one by using any (1-n)-Oblivious_
transfer protocol (e.g., [70]). He then randomizes it attribute-wise by computing
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Epk(γi,h) = Epk(pi,h) ∗ Epk(ri,h) for 1 ≤ h ≤ s. Here, ri,h is a random number in ZN ,
pi,h denotes the column h attribute value of the identity profile record pi, Epk(ri,h)
denotes the encryption of ri,h, and Epk(γi,h) denotes the encryption of γi,h. Epk(γi,h)
is sent to C2 for 1 ≤ h ≤ s.





sends them back to Bob. Note that, γ′i,h is always a random number in ZN due to the
randomization by Bob.
Bob then removes the randomness from γ′i,h to obtain the attribute values of the ith
identity profile as pi,h = γ′i,h − ri,h mod N for each received entry {ri,h, γ′i,h} for 1 ≤ h ≤ s.
Finally, Bob adds the identity profile record pi to his output set (S = S ∪ pi).
6.2.3. Security Analysis. The PPBIO protocol was secure under the semi-honest
adversary model of SMC. The protocol was a sequential composition of sub-protocols. Thus,
the security of each sub-protocol needed to be proved before the PPBIO’s security could be
proved. A detailed analysis is provided in Sections 3.5.3 and 3.5.4. Both SSEDR and SHDR
protocols were proven secure under the semi-honest model because the computations were
performed on either encrypted data or randomized data. The SCT protocol was imple-
mented using a garbled circuit, which was also secure under the semi-honest model [53].
A detailed analysis is provided in Section 3.5.10. Also, the (1-n)-Oblivious_transfer
protocol (e.g., [70]) was proved secure under the semi-honest model. All these sub-protocols
of PPBIO produced either random shares or pseudo-random as intermediate results. There-
fore, according to the sequential composition theorem [41] given in Definition 2, the PPBIO
protocol was also secure under the semi-honest model.
6.2.4. Complexity Analysis. The proposed PPBIO protocol’s computation com-
plexity was analyzed under the assumptions that encryption and decryption operations
based on the Paillier cryptosystem [75] take a similar amount of time, an exponentiation
operation was treated as an encryption operation, and an encryption operation is generally
several orders of magnitude more expensive than a multiplication. The computation com-
plexity of the SSEDR protocol was bounded by O(m) encryptions (as discussed in Section
6.1.5). The same asymptotic bound for the SHDR can be derived in a similar manner.
Additionally, the total computation cost of the SCT protocol is about that of performing
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several homomorphic encryption operations. Thus, O(m) encryptions provided an appro-
priate upper bound for the SCT (as discussed in Section 6.1.5). Also, the computational
complexity of the (1-n)-Oblivious_transfer protocol (e.g., [70]) was bounded by O(n).
The rest of the computation complexity was bounded by O(s ∗ n) encryption operations.
In order to hide the data access patterns from C1 and C2, Bob, jointly with C1, had to
retrieve the ith encrypted identity profile whose corresponding comparison result was bi = 1
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. As a consequence, Bob’s computation cost was not negligible. He did perform
some expensive computational operations bounded by O(s ∗n) encryptions. Therefore, this
work can claim that the total computation complexity of PPBIO was bound by O(s ∗ n)
encryptions.
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The cloud computing paradigm [17, 66] has recently revolutionized the organization’s
way of operating their data, particularly in the way they store, access, and process data. As
an emerging computing paradigm, cloud computing attracts many organizations to consider
a cloud’s potential in terms of its cost-efficiency, flexibility, and offload of administrative
overhead. Organizations often delegate their computational operations, in addition to their
data, to a cloud; otherwise, there would be no point in outsourcing the data at the first
place. Privacy and security issues in the cloud are preventing companies from utilizing those
advantages despite the tremendous advantages that the cloud offers. Therefore, due to the
rise of various privacy issues, sensitive data need to be encrypted before being outsourced to
the cloud. Using encryption as a way to achieve data confidentiality may cause another issue
at the cloud during the query evaluation. In general, it is very difficult to process encrypted
data in a privacy-preserving manner without ever having to decrypt it. The question here
is how the cloud can perform computations over encrypted data while the data stored in
the cloud are encrypted at all times.
Along with this direction, this study proposed three different sets of Privacy-Preserving
Query Processing (PPQP) protocols to facilitate different types of queries, namely, the k-
Nearest Neighbor (kNN) query, advanced analytical query, and correlated range query, which
preserve both the data confidentiality and the query privacy. In the proposed PPQP proto-
cols, once the data owner has outsourced his/her encrypted data to the cloud, he/she does
not participate in any computations. The proposed protocols utilize additive homomorphic
cryptosystem and/or garbled circuit technique at different stages of query processing to
achieve the best performance. In addition, all computations can be done on the encrypted
data without using very expensive fully homomorphic encryptions by adopting a multi-
cloud computing paradigm. This work empirically analyzed the efficiency of the proposed
protocols through various experiments. These results indicated that the PPQP protocols
are efficient from the end-user’s perspective. This work also emphasized that the proposed
protocols are practical in the cloud environment.
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One possible extension to the current work is to explore alternative ways of develop-
ing efficient PPQP protocols. The construction of the PPQP protocols is the most efficient
and secure two-party implementation known today. However, the empirical results clearly
showed that they are not practical. The scalability issue of PPQP protocols can be elimi-
nated or mitigated, especially in a cloud computing environment, where high-performance
parallel processing can easily be achieved. Thus, one possible work would be to implement
and evaluate the PPQP protocols using a MapReduce techniques in real cloud environment.
The set of sub-protocols that would be developed and used as basic primitives when con-
structing the proposed PPQP protocols need efficient implementation in order to improve
the performance of PPQP. One way to achieve that is to try to develop parallel solutions
to those basic primitives, which, in turn, will improve the overall performance of the PPQP
protocols.
Encryption is not the only way to protect data confidentiality, and a variety of
different techniques, such as randomization and secret sharing, exist. One can plan to
investigate whether these techniques are more efficient and scalable than the encryption
based solutions. In addition, the current work can be extended to other adversary models,
such as the malicious model. One can develop PPQP protocols that are secure under the
malicious model and evaluate the trade-offs between security and efficiency.
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